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ABSTRACT
The research for this paper consists of an inquiry into the nature and
extent of the problems the City of Cambridge faces running its neighborhood
health station program and the nature and extent of the problems of citizen
participation in that program. The research asks these questions regarding
the role of the City actors and the role of citizens who participate. How
have they shaped the program? What authority, responsibility and accounta-
bility do they have in setting and implementing policy? How do they dupli-
cate, coordinate or undercut each others efforts? What are the problems
with the role they play? Why do these problems exist and how can they be
resolved?
The research indicates that the City has serious problems setting
policy for and administering the program. Administrative leadership is
highly fragmented, jobs and responsibilities are ambiguously defined,
adequate authority and accountability of the leadership is lacking. Weak
leadership results in poor planning, frequent crises, financial instability,
inadequate medical backup, uncoordinated care, inadequate responsiveness to
community needs. An analysis of the literature on neighborhood health care
suggests these problems are not atypical.
Citizens' groups have had serious problems participating in the health
station program. Citizens do not agree with each other or with the hospital
on goals, health is a difficult issue around which to organize, and citizens'
groups lack legitimacy. Citizens' groups and the hospital have no mutually
agreed upon definition for the scope and degree of citizen participation and
no formal means of communication with each other. Citizens do not know who
at the hospital is responsible for the program. An analysis of the litera-
ture on citizen participation suggests that these problems are not atypical.
The research also inquired into the positive aspects of the program to
determine which qualities should be maintained when other changes were made.
The research concluded that despite the difficulties faced by both the City
and citizens, neighborhood health stations staffed by nurse practitioners is
the most appropriate means to provide geographically, psychologically and
financially accessible health care to low income people. A City run program
guarantees the program's ultimate accountability to the public.
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Based on an analysis of the literature on political decision making,
an analysis of the problems, an analysis of the program's benefits, and
an analysis of the constraints involved in making any changes in the
organizational structure or substance of the program, the research pointed
to the following recommended changes: The City needs to combine community
health services into one department, hire a medical director who will be
Chief of that department and whose authority will be equal to that of any
other head of a medical department. The medical director will control
services within the health stations and be in a position to negotiate with
other department heads over appropriate interface between the hospital and
the health stations. The Health Commissioner and the Health and Hospital
Board of Trustees reed to assume greater responsibility for community health
in order to strengthen the accountability of the leadership. Although
tension may always exist between citizens and the hospital, citizens will
be able to make a more substantial contribution to the program if they are
able to establish a mutually agreed upon process for relating to the hospi-
tal on a continual basis, if they are able to define the scope and nature
of their relationship to the hospital, define specific goals, strategies,
and jobs, and recognize that individual citizens groups share enough con-
cerns to work together. Adequate staffing of these groups should facili-
tate the groups gaining the necessary expertise to participate effectively.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert Hollister
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I. INTRODUCTION
Neighborhood health centers received special emphasis in the 1960's
as aspects of federal antipoverty legislation, particularly in the Economic
Opportunity Act and the Demonstration Cities Act. Advocates supported
neighborhood health centers for a variety of reasons: to provide health
care for low income people in neighborhoods where there were decreasing
numbers of physicians, to change the institutional structure of the health
care system, to break the "cycle of poverty" and to provide for the par-
ticipation of citizens in major programs which affect them. Neighborhood
health center proponents viewed neighborhood health centers as a place
where consumers and providers of health care coul1 work together, where
teams of professionals could work together to provide comprehensive care,
where new jobs could be created, and where health services and other
poverty programs could be linked.2
Many of these goals can conflict with each other, and several stu-
dies3 ,4'5 have concluded that goals of community participation can clash
with goals of service delivery. Furthermore, others * * * found that
existing hospital institutions often resist cooperating with or supporting
neighborhood health centers.
9110211212
Nonetheless, some have concluded that neighborhood health
centers and nurse practitioners can deliver accessible, comprehensive
health care comparable in quality to health services offered by other
providers. For many low income and minority groups, the neighborhood
health center provides psychological access to health services which the
9.
hospital, often considered "unknown, unreachable, distant and irrelevant
13
to the way they define their need for assistance", does not.
Neighborhood health centers originally received substantial amounts
of funding from the federal government. Federal money is no longer available
in large amounts, and the question of who will accept the responsibility
of providing health services for low income people naturally arises. For
the most part, this responsibility has fallen to public hospitals.
Even before the advent of neighborhood health centers, public hos-
pitals have tended to be responsible for patients who could not pay for
private care, and public health departments have tended to be responsible
for community health concerns. Private hospitals, which are not accountable
to the public, and which have financial incentives to reject nonpaying
patients, have tended to provide acute and episodic care rather than pri-
mary, preventive community health care. 1 4'1 5 Understandably, public
hospitals are asked to assume the financial responsibility for neighborhood
health centers. - Understandably problems occur if the hospital is not
fully committed to community medicine in low income neighborhoods.
In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the city hospital in Cambridge,
Massachusetts, established community health programs in three areas. In
low income elementary schools, school nurses were replaced by pediatric
nurse practitioners who, with physician consultation from the Pediatrics
Department, provided comprehensive health services to children. In five
health stations (indicated on map p. 18) adult nurse practitioners, psych-
iatric nurses (with physician consultation) and social workers provided
comprehensive health services to adults living in low income neighborhoods.
Four health stations are licensed as part of the hospital outpatient de-
10.
partment, and one is licensed as a free standing health center.
While the pediatric and psychiatric programs run effectively, the
adult program suffers from inefficiency, mismanagement, and controversy.
Although health stations tend to be much smaller than health centers
(8000 sq. ft. vs. 20,000 sq. ft. for example) the administrative ptoblems
tend to be similar. Because the hospital is a public institution and
thus accountable to the City Council, the public has the means to insure
the continuation of the program. Without this pressure, the program
probably would have been phased out.
This paper focuses on the adult neighborhood health station program
between 1970 and March 1976, from two perspectives - the role of the city
in setting policy for and administering the program, and the role of
citizen participation in the program. The general administrative problems
of neighborhood health centers are discussed by Zwick and Torrens,1
6
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and this paper presents an examination of these problems in one particular
city. The paper does not address issues of program effeciency which would
analyze and determine the cost-effectiveness of the program, the most appro-
priate number of health centers, or the most appropriate allocation of
services between the health stations and the hospital. The neighborhood
health stations have strong support from the City Council--support which
does not come from automatic approval of a line item budget, but rather
follows from a careful and thorough review of the program implied by the
budget. The neighborhood health station program is one of the few hospital
programs whose budget receives careful scrutiny by the Council and by
citizens. Despite this support from both the Council and citizens, the
program lacks strong direction and administrative leadership, and needs
an administrative and decisionmaking structure. Once established, the
11.
structure can be used to resolve the operational issues which inhibit
the program, and identify the means to increase program efficiency.
Therefore, this paper, by analyzing the experience of the city and the
consumers in running the program, attempts to determine the appropriate,
feasible roles for city and consumer actors necessary to insure a stable,
well run program sensitive to the needs of its users.
The role of the city is discussed with regard to several specific
neighborhood health station policy and administrative Issues: the rela-
tionship between the hospital and the health stations in the areas of
medical backup, administrative control, delivery of health care by teams,
and responsibility for expansion; and the financing mechanisms for the
health stations. Discussion of each issue includes an indication of each
actor's authority, responsibility and accountability, her or his roles
in shaping and implementing policy, and a description of how each actor
duplicates, coordinates with, or contradicts the efforts of other actors,
and what problems stem from these particular roles.
The role of citizen participation will be discussed with regard
to issues of administrative control over hiring, financing (billing) and
expansion. The role of three groups will be reviewed: the Health Care
Policy Council, the Neighborhood Family Care Center Board, and the North
Cambridge Health and Social Services Committee. Each discussion will
- include an indication of who participates; how the groups are organized;
what are their interests and powers; how they gain (or lose) legitimacy;
how they coordinate or do not coordinate with each other; what is the
nature and source of the role they play; and finally, how their role has
helped bring about institutional change of the health delivery system
or the redistribution of power.
12.
The paper includes a review of the relevant literature and analyzes
the problems in light of these theoretical perspectives. It also includes
a set of recommendations to establish more effective roles for both the
city and consumers. It is an opportune time to make such recommendations
because the city is in the process of rewriting its health ordinances,
reevaluating and reordering the priorities of the Health Department and
the Health Commissioner and appointing a new Commissioner.
The resources which form the basis of the analysis and recommendations
are my experience doing fieldwork in the Cambridge neighborhood health
station program as an advisor to one of the citizen's groups - the health
Care Policy Council - and as staff to the chairperson of the Cambridge
City Council Health and Hospital Committee, as well as the literature
on neighborhood health centers, citizen participation and social change,
and political decisionmaking.
13.
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II. DESCRIPTION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH
STATION PROGRAM IN CAMBRIDGE
Five adult neighborhood health stations, located in low-income areas
in Cambridge, provide a wide range of medical and social services to
approximately 2500 registered patients. The health stations are staffed
primarily by nurse practitioners who receive physician consultation ser-
vices from the hospital. The total budget for the entire neighborhood
health station program is approximately $700,000, most of which is money
from the City budget, and some of which is money from the federal govern-
2
ment. The bulk of the funding originally came from the federal government,
but as federal assistance has decreased, the City has assumed the major
financial responsibility.
Four of the health stations are under the direction and supervision
of the Cambridge Hospital. An advisory group, the Health Care Policy
Council, plays a limited role in setting health station policy. The fifth
health center, the Neighborhood Family Care Center (NFCC) was run by a
board formed by the Model Cities Agency until Model Cities money ran out.
The NFCC opened in 1968 as part of the Model Cities program in
Cambridge. Two of the other health stations opened in 1971 and 1972 when
the Chief of Community Medicine at the Cambridge Hospital applied for. and
received a grant from the Office of Economic Opportunity. He initiated
the neighborhood health station program in order to insure the availability
of primary care in low income neighborhoods with declining numbers of
family physicians.3 In 1973 and 1974, the health station program expanded
16.
into two other low income neighborhoods in Cambridge.
The program developed out of a complex set of goals for improved
delivery of health care and other services during the late 1960's. These
goals have produced a program which may not be the most cost-effective
way to deliver care. However, tht program is regarded as an improved
means of providing accessible health care in low income neighborhoods and
the strong, continued support of the program by the City Manager, several
physicians, the City Council, which carefully reviews and analyzes the
budget, and the citizens, who actively participate in large numbers in
the budgetary process, reflect this view. Since the total cost of the
program is less than 1% of the City budget, the City Council and the
Manager have generally considered the program an effective way to use
City funds to deliver health services at a reasonable price.
Despite considerable public support for Ehe program, it is contro-
versial and has many administrative and other problems. A large number
of people, both in a policy making and administrative capacity, play an
active role in shaping and directing the program. Serious administrative
problems substantially increase the inefficiency of the health stations.
Some of these problems are serious enough to have resulted in the closing
of the NFCC.
The following sections provide a more detailed description of the
size and scope of neighborhood health station services, of the individual
health stations and the patients who use them, the financing mechanisms of
the program, the policy makers and administrators, and, finally, the
available alternative sources of health care.
17.
A. Health Station Services: Size and Scope
The locations of five adult neighborhood health stations are marked
on the Cambridge map, p. 18. They are: the North Cambridge health station
at the M. E. Fitzgerald School in neighborhood 11; the Neighborhood Family
Care Center at 105 Windsor Street in neighborhood 4; the Mary Castriata
health station (formerly known by the name of Donnelly Field), near the
Miller's River housing in neighborhood 1; the Cambridgeport health station,
located in the Erie Street housing in neighborhood 5; and the Riverside
Health Station located in the Riverside Community Center in neighborhood 7.
Nurse practitioners, nurses who have had additional training in.
patient evaluation and diagnosis, provide routine primary care in the health
stations. Nurse practitioner services include "initial health screening and
triage, chronic and acute disease management, health counseling, family
planning, routine prenatal care, routine physical examinations, lab and
diagnosis tests within the limitations of the clinical setting, and followup
4
of all lab reports." Each health station has at least one nurse practi-
tioner. Two health stations, Mary Castriata and the Neighborhood Family
Care Center, have two nurse practitioners.
Most of the adult health stations are also staffed by a receptionist
and a health aide, both of whom are, in practice, supervised by the nurse
practitioner. At the Neighborhood Family Care Center receptionists and
health aides are supervised by the governing board of the health station.
Medical receptionists handle the medical record system, make appointments
5
for patients, and register new patients. The job of the health aide
varies from ordering supplies to performing basic lab tests and sometimes
to doing family planning counseling, depending on the preferences of the
4*v
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nurse practitioner who supervises the health aide. In some cases the health
aides are bilingual and act as translators for Spanish or Portuguese-
speaking patients.
The health stations offer other services on a part time basis. A
full-timg nutritionist divides her time among the health stations and sees
patients who are referred by the nurse practitioner. She generally
discusses an appropriate diet with prenatal, overweight or undernourished
patients.
Social workers, psychiatric nurses, physician residents and alcohol
counselors are assigned to the health stations on a part time basis, so
that patients who need or want to be referred to one of these people can
be seen in the neighborhood health station. A part time family planning
counselor divides her time among the clinics. She provides family planning
information to patients who are interested but'may not yet want or need to
see the nurse practitioner.
The Cambridge Hospital also provides consulting physician services.
A gynecologist and a general practitioner or internist visit each adult
health station at least one afternoon per week, and see patients who have
been referred to them by the nurse practitioner.
The neighborhood health stations are open during the day, but not
during the evening. Each nurse practitioner sees from 50 to 75 patients
per week, depending on her experience (newer nurse practitioners seem to
have less confidence and thus spend more time with patients initially,)
and on the other demands on her time (such as meetings with other staff
and with hospital administrators, and following up patients who are seen
- 6
at other hospital departments).
20.
As will be noted below, the health stations serve only a fraction
of the population in their respective areas. At most of the health
stations there is a six to eight week wait for people who wish to register
as new patients and for well patients who wish to receive an annual physi-
7
cal examination. At some clinics, no new patients are enrolled 'because
the nurse practitioner feels there is no time to see new patients.
Waiting lists and closed registration result partly from a lack of
physical space. Health centers tend to be larger than health stations
because they provide a wider range of services. While neighborhood health
8
centers nationally average 20,000 square feet, the Cambridge adult health
stations are much smaller, each having about 8,000 square feet, comparable
in size to health stations in other cities. In such a small space, expan-
sion of services is almost impossible. The North Cambridge health station,'
for example, has one examining room and a waiting room. The nurse practi-
tioner cannot see patients when the physician, psychiatric nurse, social
worker or nutritionist is present unless .somebody sees patients in the
waiting room or the bathroom.
B. Patients
The kinds of patients seen at the adult health stations tend to vary
with each health station, but the patient population is representative of
the neighborhood where it is located, with one exception. Very few
patients are male.
Mary Castriata Health Center. The neighborhood surrpunding this
clinic is one of Cambridge's designated Model Cities areas. The largest
concentration of Spanish and Portuguese speaking people live in this area,
9
as well as large numbers of general relief and welfare recipients. The
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health station opened in August, 1972 and serves an area (East Cambridge
and Donnelly Field) with a population of approximately 13,000. In 1972,
there were only one or two doctors who had private practices in the
neighborhood. These doctors were about 70 years old at that time, and
since then no new physicians have set up practices in the neighborhood.1 0
The regular nurse practitioner sees between 60 and 75 patients per
week, and a new nurse practitioner sees about. 50 patients per week. 11
The projected number of visits at the clinic in 1975-76 is 3,800.12 Many
of the patients who use the health station speak only Portuguese. The
health station, which has bilingual staff, is more responsive to their
needs than the hospital, where interpreters are frequently unavailable.
The neighborhood setting allows the nurse practitioner to become
familiar with the cultural characteristics of the Portuguese patients and
makes it easier for her to understand what rold she can play in addressing
their social, medical and psychological needs. Many patients who have
psychiatric problems are much more willing to be seen in the neighborhood
setting than at the psychiatric outpatient department because they needn't
label themselves publicly as in need of psychiatric help.1 3
Neighborhood Family Care Center. The Neighborhood Family Care
Center, on Windsor Street, was the first comprehensive neighborhood health
center in the City. When it opened in 1968, the clinic offered pediatric,
psychiatric and social services. In 1970, a physician from MIT volunteered
to provide family planning services, and an adult nurse practitioner came
with him. The health center is in a Model Cities Neighborhood, which
contains very high numbers of Spanish speaking people and two public
housing programs, Washington Elms and Newtown Court.
22.
Many of the patients at the center are Spanish speaking and/or live
in the housing projects. When the health center was fully staffed, the
14
nurse practitioners saw between 60 and 80 patients per week. In 1973,
2,000 adult patients were registered in the 'health .center and 8,700 visits
15 16
were estimated. In 1974, however, there were only 4,000 visits, a
decrease primarily due to severe personnel and staffing problems. There
is no alternative source of care within the neighborhood. One elderly
physician practices in the neighborhood.1 7
The nurse practitioners at the NFCC, like those at the Mary Castriata
health station, feel that the neighborhood setting provides the occasion
for them to learn about the needs of the people living in the neighborhood.
The health center is not open at night, because there are no adequate
security measures, and the nurses try to meet the needs of working people
by scheduling their appointments early in the day.
The health center has been closed since the summer, during a contro-
versy over control of the health center between the city of Cambridge and
two neighborhood groups--the Neighborhood Family Care Center Board of
Directors and the Spanish Council. When the controversy is settled, the
health center will reopen in a new and more spacious location in the
building next door.
North Cambridge Health Center. The North Cambridge health station
is located in the M. E. Fitzgerald elementary school in North Cambridge,
a community north of the B & M railroad tracks with a population of
approximately 12,000. The population is fairly stable, with most people
living in owner occupied two or three family houses. A large number of
i23.
French Canadians live in the area. A large number of elderly people live
near Massachusetts Avenue in the Clarendon Hill housing project for the
elderly. One housing project, Jefferson Park, is in the neighborhood.1 8
In 1972, there were two family physicians whose average age was 55. Now
19
there is only one.
The health station projected it would have 3,000 visits during the
20
1975-76 year. In 1974, there were 2,000 patient visits. One nurse-
21
practitioner sees about 65-70 patients a week. Enrolled patients must
wait approximately six weeks for an appointment, and no new patients are
accepted because the wait is so long. Money has been budgeted for an
additional nurse practitioner, but in the present health station, the
space is not sufficient for two nurse practitioners. Most of the health
station patients live within a ten or fifteen minute walk of the health
station (68%) and some (17%) come from the hous'ing project.2 2
As in the other clinics, the neighborhood setting allows the nurse
practitioner to meet the needs of the community. The health station opens
at 8:00 a.m. to accomodate working patients. Patients with psychiatric
and alcoholism problems are willing to see the nurse practitioner because
she is receptive to their problems, while they are often not willing to go
to the hospital. The disproportionately low use of hospital based mental
health services, relative to the population, indicates people's reluctance
to use the hospital.2 3
Cambridgeport. Cambridgeport is a residential neighborhood with an
increasingly large transient population and a very large number of elderly
24
people. The health station is located in a housing project for the
elderly in the middle of the neighborhood. There are now no family
24.
physicians operating in the area. The last one closed his practice in
December, 1975.
The health station has ample room for two nurse practitioners but
only one had been hired and her position is empty now. The highest
percentage of elderly patients, 21%, are seen in this health station.25
Many of the remaining registrants are young women who come for family
planning services.26 The two nurse practitioners from the Neighborhood
Family Care Center see both Neighborhood Family Care Center and
Cambridgeport patients at the Cambridgeport health station. When the
Neighborhood Family Care Center reopens, there will be no nurse practitioner
coverage in Cambridgeport.
Neighborhood residents and the people living in the elderly housing
have disagreed bitterly over whether neighborhood residents could use the
health station. Many residents of the Erie street housing felt that the
health station should only be for elderly people.
Riverside. The Riverside health station, in the Cambridge Community
Center, which opened in 1974, is the newest- health station. The population
base of the health station is 6,000, and there are no physicians practicing
in the neighborhood. A low income housing project, most of whose residents
are black, is one block away. Harvard married student housing is nearby.
27
During the first year, there were 950 patient visits. Most of the
patients were white, middle class women who wanted family planning services. 2 8
Very few patients came from the nearby housing projects, because they did
not know much about the health station and tended not to seek anything
other than emergency medical care.
25.
The five neighborhood health stations provide accessible primary
medical care as well as psychiatric and social services to low income
people in neighborhoods where there are few practicing physicians.
Patients feel more comfortable using neighborhood health centers than
using the hospital because of the bilingual staff and the sensitivity
of the nurse practitioners, who not only provide primary care, but who
also teach patients about disease management so that they understand
their problems, can take care of themselves, and can prevent problems in
the future.
C. Financial Sponsors. The City of Cambridge and the federal
government, through the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Council (CEOC) fund
the neighborhood health program. The approximate budget is:2 9
Year Federal City
1972 110,000 35,000
1973-74 (18 mo.) 115,000 213,000
1974-75 115,000 526,000
1975-76 70,000 618,000
The federal money, an HEW family planning grant, pays for a program
coordinator, nutritionist, family life educator, ob-gyn physician consul-
30
tation, some rent, and some supplies. Another HEW grant underwrites
some services for pregnant mothers and young children. Model Cities has
provided substantial amounts of money to the NFCC, about $118,000 in
31
1973. In that same year, the NFCC also received $72,800 from private
32
sources.
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While the financial support for the program originally came from
the federal government, the program has grown substantially, federal
money has decreased, and the City has assumed increasing financial respon-
sibility. The Ob-Gyn Department at the hospital has applied for an HEW
maternal and infant care grant that would fund part of the neighborhood
health program. This grant has not yet received approval.
None of the various monies for the health stations are administered
from the same place. The City Manager, through the Hospital Director, is
ultimately responsible for the City money, CEOC administers one HEW grant,
the Department of Pediatrics administers another, the Model Cities board
controlled Model Cities money, and the Ob-Gyn Department is applying for
the maternal and infant care grant. The City Council, ultimately respon-
sible for making the decision to compensate for losses due to decreased
federal funding, has not, until recently, been aware of the extent of
federal financial support. Despite rising costs, the City Council has
been willing to appropriate money needed, not only to keep the program at
present levels, but also to expand it.
D. Policy Makers and Administrators
Identification of the actual policy makers and administrators is
difficult because nobody really agrees who they are. Table I is the
hospital's organization chart, and Table II is a composite of the per-
ceptions of the different personnel involved in the program of the
program's place within the Health Department organization.
Leadership of the program is obviously fragmented and decentralized.
Distinctions between policy makers and administrators are fuzzy because
TABLE I
Organization Chart, Cambridge Hospital
HEALTH & HOSPITALS COMM.
OF CITY COUNCIL '
CITY COUNCIL
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the weak Health and Hospital Board and the absence of a Health Commissioner
(the former Commissioner resigned on December 31, 1974,) has resulted in
a diffusion of policy making responsibilities among the different adminis-
trators, whose responsibilities already overlap or conflict.
The following section identifies and introduces the different actors
who have played policy making or administrative roles in the neighborhood
health station program. Their different formal and informal program
responsibilities, their different interests in specific issues, and their
problems dealing with issues will be discussed briefly.
City Council. The City Council votes on the budget, although most
of the budget decisions are made by the time the Council meets to vote.
City councillors tend to view the budgetary process not always as a way
of assuring the implementation of well thought out policies, but sometimes
as.a way of responding to a constituency and assuring that money is in
the budget for politically popular programs. For example, money is voted
for the neighborhood health station program when City councillors look at
the audience and see the seats full of health station patients and sup-
porters. This bias toward politically popular programs works in two ways.
If the City Manager promotes substantial policy, the Council may substi-
tute policies which are more politically expedient. At the same time,
if the executive offices are not responsive to people's needs, the City
Council is the mechanism whereby the executive offices are made accountable
to the general public. Like any legislative body, the Council cannot
perform executive functions such as implementing policy. However, the
City Council can make policy, and it does so when it votes a budget.
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The City Council supports the health stations because City councillors
who have taken the time to learn about the program support it, because the
program is highly visible and because it has a vocal constituency. Since
both the high level executive branch (the City Manager,) and the City
Council support the program, there is no problem obtaining the necessary
appropriations.
City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee. This Subcommittee has
played an increasingly large role in setting neighborhood health center
policy in Cambridge in the past two years. In monthly or bimonthly meetings
with physicians and hospital administrators, the Subcommittee: 1) has
increased its understanding of what the program implications are of a
$618,000 line item budget so it knows what services the City is buying;
2) has provided a forum for the resolution of policy problems and imple-
mentation problems so that difficulties need n6t go before the City Manager
or the City Council. Some personnel are threatened by these meetings. They
fear the City Manager will intervene if they don't act, so they make and
implement some policy decisions. The Subcommittee does not determine how
policy is implemented, although some hospital people feel the Subcommittee
is overstepping its boundaries in making any kind of policy decision.
The Subcommittee spends much of its time pressuring the hospital to
implement the policy of neighborhood health stations. While the City is
ready to institutionalize the program by accepting financial responsibility,
the executive offices have notbeen able to administer it.
City Manager. The City Manager is ultimately responsible for pre-
paring the budget and submitting it to the City Council for approval. He
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also hires City personnel. Usually, he delegates policy and budgetary
authority to the Health Commissioner. In the absence of a Commissioner,
the Hospital director has responsibility, but running the health stations
and the Hospital is too time consuming, even for the most able hospital
director.
Planning Department and Community Development Office. Occasionally,
personnel in these offices have been asked to prepare studies on appropri-
ate neighborhood health center location for the Commissioner or City
Manager. The staff person responsible for coordinating health and social
services within the city, has been unable to spend much time on this
project because she has been acting as the City's representative in nego-
tiations with the NFCC over its certificate-of-need application.
Commissioner of Health and Hospitals. The Commissioner makes and
assures the implementation of health policy in 'Cambridge. The position
has been vacant since January, 1975. The previous Commissioner was an
occasional advocate of neighborhood health stations, in that he sometimes
made policy, but only sometimes saw that it was carried out.
Health and Hospital Board of Trustees. This weak advisory board has
contributed little, in the form of policy direction, to the health station
program, but when its powers are increased under the new health ordinances,
its contribution should be greater.
Hospital Director. In the absence of a Commissioner, the ospital
director is responsible for the neighborhood health station program because
he supervises both the program administrator and the head of the nursing
service. He must sign off on any administrative personnel hired for the
health stations, and on any policy made for the health stations by his
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administrative staff. He tends to feel that running the health stations
and the Hospital is too big a job.34 According to his job description,
he is to provide liason among policy makers, and to implement established
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policies but since there is no Commissioner, his role as policy maker
has increased. A major difference in authority between the Hospital
director and the Commissioner is that the Chiefs of service are directly
accountable for their actions to the Commissioner. The Hospital director's
authority is budgetary.
Neighborhood Health Services Committee. Composed of all the Chiefs
and department heads, this group, craated by the Commissioner, was supposed
to coordinate neighborhood health services. However, few people understood
how much policy or management power the group had, or what the relationship
was between this group and the medical executive committee. In January 1974,
the committee requested to become a standing committee of the medical
executive committee, and to be responsible for "coordination and direction"
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of the health stations. The Commissioner did not act on the request.
In December, 1975, the Hospital director assigned the committee a
new role. The committee had an "objective: the planning, organization,
control, and evaluation" of the health stations, and, a "purpose: to
insure the delivery of needed community health services in an efficient
"37
and effective manner. Although the job description would appear to
include policy making capability, the Hospital director feels that this
committee is a management committee which implements, rather than makes,
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policy. The committee has not played an effective role in either area.
Project Coordinator. The HEW family planning grant, administered by
CEOC, calls for a project coordinator who supervises all nonmedical
111111111  1, , 11 1,101
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personnel, coordinates training programs, and orders supplies. The
project coordinator functions as a community organizer who is the staff
to the Health Care Policy Council, a neighborhood health station citizen
advisory group. She also runs the family planning education programs in
the health stations and orders some of the contraceptive supplies.
Program Administrator. The project coordinator position, as origi-
nally described in the HEW grant, has been shifted to the City payroll
under the name of program administrator. The Neighborhood Community Care
Committee had requested this position, and had wanted the person to
coordinate health station programs by doing the budget, taking care of
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supplies, keeping statistics, and working with community groups.
The administrator called himself director of neighborhood health
services in his job description, and said he was responsible for the
supervision and direction of the health statiois, and for setting policy
and management plans with the 'Neighborhood Health Services Committee.
In January, 1976, the administrator was replaced by a unit manager,
whose responsibilities included ordering supplies, and dealing with
licensing and billing issues.
Nurse Practitioner Supervisor. This administrator in the nursing
department is responsible for coordinating continuing education programs
for the nurse practitioners, assisting in the establishment of protocols
(decisions about what kinds of medical problems nurse practitioners take
care of by themselves, and which they refer to physicians), representing
the nurse practitioners at professional or community meetings, and
establishing liasons between the hospital and the health stations. The
position was vacant for two years before it was refilled in the fall of 1975.
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Director of Nursing. This person hires and supervises all nursing
personnel, including nurse practitioners. When the nurse practitioner
supervisor position was vacant, the Nursing Director did not delegate
the responsibilities to anyone, nor did she assume them herself.
Nurse practitioner. Nurse practitioners run all the health stations
except the NFCC. They are service providers, as well as administrators
who end up assuming many responsibilities hospital personnel do not meet.
Their job description stat-es that they are "accountable and responsibl.e
to the recipient and the institution for the quality of care rendered."
4 2
The individual to whom they are responsible is not explicitly stated,
although it has been assumed that they are responsible immediately to the
Nursing Director and ultimately to the Hospital Director.
Chiefs of Service. Each Chief of Service is responsible for the
provision of physician services from her or his departmcnt in the health
stations, and for medical backup at the hospital. These services include
psychiatry, internal medicine, pediatrics and obstetrics-gynecology.
Chiefs are accountable to the Commissioner, but not the Hospital director.
Health Care Policy Council. The Health Care Policy Council is a
citizen' s advisory board concerned with the health stations. The group
was organized by CEOC and the Medicine Department in 1973, when the health
station budget was threatened. Residents of each neighborhood where there
is a health station sit on the Council, and the group as a whole is
interested in issues of billing, hiring and service mix, but has a great
deal of trouble participating in any decisions made by other actors. The
group is unsure what role it desires to play, and unsure of an appropriate
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structure and organization. The group and the hospital disagree sharply
over an appropriate role for citizen participation.
Neighborhood Family Care Center Board. This board controls the
NFCC, having both administrative and policy setting responsibilities.
The City and the NFCC board are involved in a bitter controversy over
control of the NFCC.
E. Alternative Sources of Care
Whether neighborhood health stations staffed by nurse practitioners
is the best way to provide medical and health services has been the
subject of a great deal of debate. A brief examination of the existing
alternatives suggests that although neighborhood health stations may not
be the most cost-effective or efficient means to deliver medical and
health care, alternative ways of delivering services might not provide
comprehensive health services which are geographically, financially, and
psychologically accessible to low income people.
Going to private physicians is not a real alternative. The popu-
lation base of the neighborhood health stations is 50,000, and there are
four physicians practicing in the areas served by the health stations,
all of whom are old, and none of whom is a pediatrician. The Chief of
Medicine initiated the health station program in the first place because
the supply of medical care providers in these neighborhoods was so
limited. It is questionable whether Brattle Street physicians (physicians
in a wealthy neighborhood) would accpet low income people as patients and
provide high quality, continuing care for them, and whether low-income
Cambridge residents would use them. The assumption of those physicians,
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who initiated the neighborhood health station program was that care from
private family physicians was not available to low income people, and,
the availability of this alternative has continued to decline over the
years. While there is talk of opening group practices in some of the low
income neighborhoods, serious consideration should be given to whether
group practices oriented toward the delivery of acute medical care, are
preferable substitutes for nurse practitioners, who provide a wider range
of health and social services.
A second alternative, the outpatient department at the Cambridge
Hospital, does not provide convenient, continuous care for patients in its
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present form. Patients rarely see a doctor on a regular basis because
the scheduling of physicians does not allow this kind of continuity.
Follow up is often inadequate, because the medical records are too scanty
to allow for continuous care, and scheduling problems mean long waits for
the patients at the hospital. Bilingual staff is limited. The physicians
do not keep complete medical records, and thus providing continuous care
is made more difficult. Distance and travel times to the outpatient
department are problems for some patients, particularly those from North
Cambridge.44 Although the City could provide transportation, most patients
walk (within 10 minutes) to neighborhood health stations and the percentage
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of those who drive, take taxis, or public transit is much smaller.
Therefore, there is some question about how many people would use a trans-
portation program even it if were provided. Furthermore, outpatient
department personnel are not familiar with the special needs of individual
neighborhoods, and tend to respond primarily to medical problems, rather
ft
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than to a wider range of health and social issues. Changing the orienta-
46
tion of OPD personnel has been extremely difficult in other areas.
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That OPD usage is decreasing and waiting times for appointments at the
neighborhood health stations is increasing, -illustrates people's preferences.
The Emergency Room is not an adequate substitute for neighborhood
health stations, either. The Emergency Room staff provides emergency care,
so people who want complete physicals or more comprehensive care are
referred to the OPD. The care provided is continuous with care patients
receive elsewhere only when a physician or a nurse practitioner goes to
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the ER to find the discharge summary.
The Harvard Community Health Plan, a prepaid group practice, has a
branch near the Cambridge Hospital. HCHP offers comprehensive care on a
prepaid basis, either individually, or in groups through employers. Although
the care is considered to be quite good by supporters of the program, the
program is financially, psychologically, and in some cases, geographically
inaccessible to many low-income Cambridge residents. While the City
could pay the HCHP enrollment fees for patients, it would still be ques-
tionable whether people would use the plan. After HCHP's unsuccessful
experience enrolling low-income people in its Boston branch, it would be
unclear whether the HCHP leadership would want to undertake a similar
effort in Cambridge. The HCHP expressed a goal of enrolling low income
people in its plan and opened a -satellite in Mission Hill-a low income
neighborhood in Boston. Since many people enrolled did not use the HCHP
exclusively, HCHP lost interest because it had to pay for all the OPD and
ER visits made by members in the plan. Since the Cambridge HCHP branch
is near the Cambridge Hospital, patients would have to bear the same time
and travel costs as going to the hospital--costs which are prohibitive to
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some people. Furthermore, many low income residents in Cambridge are
antagonistic toward Harvard, and since the Harvard Health Plan is
associated with Harvard, even if only by name, many people might refuse
enrollment. The Hospital director himself feels that HCHP is designed
primarily for young, transient, middle class people.
The review of available alternative sources of health care illus-
trates the four basic problems with these alternatives.
1. Financial inaccessibility: People who are considered "medically
indigent," that is, who are not on some form of public assistance, do not
have the money themselves and do not have employers who provide medical
coverage, cannot afford to join the Harvard Health Plan or use a private
physician.
2. Psychological inaccessibility: The Cambridge Hospital and the
Harvard Health Plan both have characteristics which make them psychologi-
cally inaccessible. These institutions can be distant, imposing and
impersonal, and their employees tend to be insensitive to neighborhood
needs and values. Furthermore, both are affiliated with Harvard, an
institution perceived as being insensitive to low income Cambridge resi-
dents and as being a direct threat to them. (Harvard's students who force
rent raises, making it harder for people who have lived in Cambridge all
their lives to keep living in their neighborhoods, Harvard's attempts to
expand the boundaries of its campus and rebuild parts of neighborhoods for
dorms, and Harvard's tax free status are examples.)
3. Geographic inaccessibility. Lack of a car, difficulties pro-
viding for child care (lack of facilities at the institution or inability
to pay for a baby-sitter, unwillingness to leave work for long periods of
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time, or inability to travel very far (elderly patients), make- the time
and travel costs of using the Cambridge Hospital too high for many people.
Studies indicate that people's use of hospital outpatient services declines
when the distance from the hospital increases and when they have to use
public transportation. OPD use further declines when patients have to use
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two or more public transports.
4. Lack of continuous quality care. While the Harvard Health Plan
emphasizes continuous care, the Emergency Room and outpatient department
at the hospital tend to provide acute care rather than preventive care or
health maintenance, and the structure and organization of these departments
does not allow for the provision of continuous care.
Given the alternatives to neighborhood health care described above,
and given the disadvantages to these alternatives, it is understandable
why the program was initiated and why the demand for it is so high:
Care at the neighborhood health stations is financially accessible
to everyone, and will continue to be accessible, even when billing begins.
Care is continuous because each nurse, practitioner follows a group
of patients on a regular basis.
Care is comprehensive because the nurse practitioners are sensitive
to health related issues, including environmental, social, and psychological
issues. The nurse practitioners do not limit themselves only to medical
care. However, the medical care they do provide is considered to be as
adequate as that provided by any physician. (See further discussion in
Chapter V.)
Patient education is a substantial part of service delivery, so
patients have the opportunity to understand the treatment program and to
participate more fully in it.
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The neighborhood location of the health stations allows greater
geographic, and psychological accessibility for the patients, as well
as allows the nurse practitioner a greater understanding of the cultural
norms in the community where she works.
The next two chapters present and discuss issues which illustrate
the controversy and the problems of the program, paying particular
attention to the role the City and citizens' groups have played making
and implementing policy for the health stations. From a discussion and
analysis of these issues will emerge a set of policy and implementation
recommendations which should address the most serious difficulties and
establish a process for improving the services.
i|
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2. Exact budget figures for the program are not available, because the
adult health station budget has not been separated from the pediatric
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family planning grant, administered by CEOC, contributes $70,000.
Another federal grant, administered by the Pediatrics Department at
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the Neighborhood Family Care Center, and the School Department pays
the overhead for health stations located in the schools.
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III. THE ROLE OF THE CITY IN SETTING POLICY FOR AND
ADMINISTERING THE NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH STATION PROGRAM
This chapter contains a discussion of the evolution of several
policy and administrative issues regarding the neighborhood health station
program. These issues are: 1) the relationship between the hospital and
the health stations in the areas of medical backup from the hospital,
administrative control of the health stations, delivery of coordinated
team care, responsibility for expansion of the health stations, and 2)
financing mechanisms for the health stations.
Discussion of each issue will include an indication of what authority,
responsibility, and accountability each actor has had, what roles she or
he has played in determining or implementing policy, how each actor dupli-
cates, coordinates with, or contradicts the efforts of other actors, and
what the problems are with the program as it presently operates.
A. Relationship of Health Stations to the Hospital
1. Medical Backup. This section describes the relationship between
the health stations and the hospital regarding medical backup including
the responsibilities of those individuals involved in medical backup, the
problems the health stations experience in obtaining adequate medical
backup, and the ways in which the problems have been resolved.
The hospital is supposed to provide medical backup for the health
stations, in the form of consultation services, both in the health stations,
outpatient specialty clinics and inpatient service. Physicians are expected
to provide on-site medical coverage several hours per week and to provide
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continuous telephone consultation. A complex set of relationships among
the nurse practitioners, the consulting physicians, the department chiefs
and the Director of Nursing sometimes results in inefficient and inade-
quate medical backup.
The following description of the administrative structure of the
health station program will indicate the difficulties of addressing these
issues before they reach crisis proportions.
Each Chief of Service (Ob-gyn, Internal Medicine, Psychiatry, Pedi-
atrics) is responsible for the delivery of services in her or his depart-
ment, both in the hospital and in the health stations. Each Chief is
responsible for providing direct physician coverage in the health stations
at least one session per week in order that a physician can see patients
referred by the nurse practitioner. Each Chief is also responsible for
providing a schedule of doctors who will be available on a regular basis
to be called at the hospital for. a telephone consultation with the nurse
practitioners. Chiefs are responsible for scheduling and supervising
interns and residents who work in the health stations. Any coordination
among the various services takes place in the Neighborhood Health Services
Committee (the Committee of Chiefs).
Chiefs are accountable for their actions to the Health Commissioner.
At the moment, the Health Commissioner's position is vacant, the Hospital
Director does not have the power to direct the Chiefs, and the City Manager
has the power, but not the time. Consequently, the Chiefs function inde-
pendently.
Both the Chiefs and the Nursing Department are responsible for devel-
oping the protocols, the standards which determine the nature of the tele-
phone consultation between the nurse practitioner and the physician. The
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protocols indicate which kinds of symptoms a nurse practitioner may treat
without consulting the physician and which indicate the need for a consul-
tation. The protocols also suggest how the physician should respond to
the nurse practitioner - whether and when the physician should question
the evaluation of the nurse practitioner or accept it as she reports it.
The head of the nursing service is responsible for supervising,
hiring and training nurse practitioners. Usually she hires a person to
supervise nurse practitioners. The nurse practitioner supervisor works
on the protocols, provides for the continuing medical education of the
nurse practitioners, is responsible for hiring nurse practitioners and
hiring nurses and enrolling them in the nurse practitioner training programs.
In terms of medical backup, leadership for the neighborhood health
stations program is terribly fragmented. When problems occur, determining
who is responsible for providing a solution is difficult. Encouraging
the person to do something'constructive is even more difficult. Most of
the crises concerning medical backup occur in the Department of Medicine.
The pediatric program is controlled by the Chief of Pediatrics, whose
hospital department is small enough that he can run both the department
and the pediatric health station program.
In December 1974, the problem of inadequate medical backup in the
Internal Medicine Department, both in terms of on-site coverage and con-
sults, became acute. The way the hospital dealt with the problem indicated
either an inability to run the health station program effectively or a
lack of adequate commitment to the program. The development of the issue
and its resolution took place in the following way.
Throughout the fall of 1974, the nurse practitioner who attended
meetings of the Neighborhood Health Services Committee (Committee of
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Chiefs) suggested that medical backup from the Internal Medicine Department
was inadequate. In a memo, the nurse practitioners described the problems
as little on-site physician medical coverage, little supervision of interns,
poor telephone coverage, unfamiliarity of physicians with the protocols,
poor communication between the physicians and the rest of the staff, and
2
lack of a director. The nurse practitioner who attended the meetings
asked that the committee take steps to improve the telephone coverage and
to replace two physicians who had been responsible for medical backup and
who had resigned. Telephone coverage was so poor that nurse practitioners
often spent 45 minutes to an hour trying to reach a physician. The physi-
cian who ended up taking the call was often unfamiliar with the protocols
(and thus the conversation took more time) and sometimes was unfamiliar
with the health station program and the expanded role of the nurse practi-
tioner (as opposed to the more limited role of a nurse). Resignation of
the two physicians severly reduced the on-site physician coverage in
several health stations.
The Neighborhood Health Services Committee did not act on any of
the nurse practitioners' comments. The chairman recognized the problem,
but felt there was little the committee could do. Although he did not
attend regularly, the Chief of Medicine came to several meetings, so he
was aware of the problems. He did not take any actions to ameliorate
the difficulties because the health station program was a low priority.
The nurse practitioner also informed the project administrator of the
inadequate medical backup. He could not do anything himself, nor could
he persuade the Chief of Medicine to do anything. The Hospital Director
was not really aware of the dimensions of the problem.3
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In November, one of the doctors who resigned sent a letter to the
project administrator and the entire Neighborhood Health Services Committee
stating his reasons for resigning. They were: "there is no person clearly
in charge." Nobody knows to whom to go for support or direction. "On
call physicians seem forgetful or disinterested in the matters of their
appointed rotations and the routine protocols." They change their schedules
without arranging for substitutes. Interns are not supervised. Coordina-
tion with the Outpatient Department is so poor that "requests for consulta-
tions come back unanswered and patients referred in for consultation are
often started on medication before the nurse practitioner and her internist
are notified."4
No action was taken by anybody during the fall to address these
grievances or to fill the vacant physician's position.
The City Council Subcommittee on Health and Hospitals usually holds
meetings at the hospital once a month. These open meetings, attended
by all the Chiefs, a nurse practitioner, the Director of Nursing, the
Director of Social Services, the Hospital Director and consumers, became
the forum for discussion of problems pertaining to neighborhood health
stations which could not be resolved within the hospital. There is little
incentive within the hospital structure to resolve issues since there is
no Commissioner and little accountability. The Subcommittee provides
some incentive in the form of an unstated, implied assumption that if
problems were not resolved, they would be taken either to the City Council
or to the City Manager. Because the City Manager controlled the budget
decisions, the hospital staff generally preferred not to have an anta-
gonistic relationship with him.
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When it became apparent that neither the project administrator,
Neighborhood Health Services Committee, Hospital Director, or Chief of
Medicine had taken any effective measures to improve the situation, the
City Council Subcommittee intervened.
The Subcommittee was aware that the nurse practitioners threatened
to resign unless the difficulties were resolved. In their statement of
the problems, they offered several solutions: hiring a director for the
health stations, providing an orientation for all physicians which described
the health station program and the protocols, revising the telephone
schedule to allow for better coverage and to provide for physician alter-
nates, assigning a regular meeting time for all professional staff who
are involved with the health stations.5
The City Council Subcommittee intervention is an example of how
the City Council can bring about policy decisions' and problem resolutions.
Subcommittee intervention occured in the following way: at a Subcommiittee
meeting, responsibility for revising the telephone schedule and for pro-
viding adequate on-site coverage was assigned explicitly to the Chief of
Medicine who previously had responsiblity but had not given the issue any
priority. He was asked to provide a schedule within two weeks and he did
so, although several staff members complained that the City Council was
bringing "politics" into the hospital and was meddling in hospital business.
At that time the City Council Subcommittee saw its role as setting health
policy in a very general sense. When the City Council votes on the budget,
it sets a policy of continuing the existence of neighborhood health stations.
How that policy was implemented was not considered by the hospital or the
City Council to be within the Subcommittee's jurisdiction.
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Since the nurse practitioners threatened to resign, and therefore
force the .health stations to close, the City Council felt justified to
intervene. However, the Council did feel that pursuing the nurse practi-
tioners' recommendations any further - hiring a program director or pro-
viding mechanisms for better communication between physician and staff -
constituted overstepping the line between setting policy and making admini-
strative decisions. While the Council meeting provided the impetus for
a solution to the most pressing problems, there still remained no process
to deal effectively with future problems.
2. Administrative Control. The fragmented administrative structure
of the neighborhood health station program, in which everybody controls
a piece of the program but nobody has responsibility for overall direction,
and where individual Chiefs appear to be accountable to no one, results
in many complications and difficulties.
While the Director of Nursing supposedly supervises, trains and
hires nurse practitioners, she has not fulfilled this responsibility, nor
did she delegate any authority to anyone until the fall of 1975. She has
not been available to assist the nurse practitioners in their efforts to
obtain greater physician coverage and she has done little recruiting for
additional nurse practitioners. Consequently, when a nurse practitioner
is ill, there is often no one to cover the health station. The low enroll-
ment of nurses in the adult nurse practitioner training course illustrates
the conclusion that no one is taking responsibility for hiring and training.
Since nurse practitioners are in great demand, training nurses to become
nurse practitioners by enrolling them in local programs (MGH for example)
is a way to insure adequate staffing. The Chief of Pediatrics makes sure
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that a nurse is enrolled in the pediatric nurse practitioner program
almost every time the course is given. Neither the Chief of Medicine
nor the Director of Nursing takes this step to provide for an adequate
number of adult nurse practitioners. Consequently, when the Neighborhood
Family Care Center reopens, there will be no nurse practitioner at the
Cambridgeport Health Station.
The Director of Nursing's efforts to hire nurse practitioners who
are already trained have not been successful either. The nurse practi-
tioner at the Cambridgeport health station resigned in early fall 1975,
and she has not been replaced. The nurse practitioner at the M.E. Fitz-
gerald School announced in July 1975 that she would be taking a leave
of absence at the end of January 1976. On January 20, 1976, a new nurse
practitioner had not been hired.
As in the crisis concerning medical backup,' the City Council Sub-
committee in its usual reactive position, intervened when it became readily
apparent that no one at the hospital was assuming responsibility for
either hiring a new nurse practitioner or providing increased on-site
physician coverage. This time, the Subcommittee intervened when the Health
Care Policy Council (a citizen's advisory board) threatened to bring the
issue before the City Council. The Subcommittee persuaded the City Manager
to meet with the Hospital Director and acting Chief of Medicine and to
tell them to hire a medical director for the health stations and to hire
a nurse practitioner. A trained nurse practitioner was found and hired
within the week. As a result of pressure from the Manager and the City
Council, the Hospital Director assumed the Nursing Director's responsi-
bility for hiring a nurse practitioner, but the process itself did not
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provide a clear pattern or direction for the future. For example, when
the nurse practitioner who took the job heard it was available, her con-
tact with the hospital was made for her by another nurse practitioner,
because the Nursing Department did not return any of her calls when she
wanted to apply for the job. While the Director of Nursing claimed that
no one answered her advertisements, when the Hospital Director took
responsibility for advertising, he received calls from qualified people
within two days.
Although a nurse practitioner was hired, there is still no one who
has accepted responsibility for finding a nurse practitioner in Cambridge-
port, or for running the program. During meetings when the issue of who
was in charge came up, responsibility was passed off on whoever was not
present. Potentially responsible people include the Hospital Director,
the Chief of Medicine and the Director of Nursin'g, but each one denies
having responsibility.
The lack of leadership results in a number of other administrative
problems which do not reach crisis proportions and which the City Council
Subcommittee does not deal with, but which greatly increase the ineffi-
ciency of the health station program. Nobody knows who is responsible
for hiring and supervising nonmedical professional staff in the health
stations.
While job descriptions do not necessarily mean that the person
holding the j.ob actually will do his or her job according to the description,
clear job descriptions provide a way for people to be held accountable for
what they do. However, job descriptions for neighborhood health station
personnel are either ambiguous or conflicting. The job of nurse practi-
tioner includes supervision of aides and receptionists, but so does the
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job of the project administrator. The project administrator's job also
includes hiring responsibility in coordination with other professional
staff, but neither the Nursing Department nor the Internal Medicine staff
has actively participated in nonprofessional hiring. In the Neighborhood
Family Care Center, nonprofessional staff is supervised by and accountable
to the Board of Directors. Often, theyrefuse to cooperate with the nurse
practitioners, who have no recourse since there is no communication between
the board and the nurse practitioners. Understaffing .on all levels - phy-
sicians, nurse practitioners, health aides and receptionists - makes it
very difficult for the nurse practitioners to do their work efficiently.
The lack, for over a year, of a nurse practitioner supervisor resulted in
the nurse practitioners' having to spend more time dealing with administra-
tive issues (hiring, medical backup, coordination with hospital - discussed
below -) and less time seeing patients.6
Lack of administrative leadership is also suggested by the fact that
over a year ago, the City Council passed a motion requesting the addition of
a health station with evening hours. No one has taken any steps to imple-
ment that policy.
The project administrator's job has been the subject of a great deal
of confusion ever since an individual was hired for this position. Ori-
ginally, the job was called "project coordinator" and was part of an HEW
- family planning grant. A community organizer for health issues was paid
out of the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee (CEOC) budget. The
project coordinator job was advertised in the Boston Globe as being a job
offered by CEOC. As mentioned earlier, the job was basically administrative.
Recruiting and interviewing were done by CEOC. During the interview process,
the Director of CEOC and the Health Commissioner made an arrangement whereby
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the CEOC community organizer became the project coordinator, although the
job would still involve organizing the community and providing staff to
the citizens' advisory group, and the project coordinator became the project
administrator. Although the job was essentially the same, the location was
different. The person moved from CEOC to the hospital and from the HEW
payroll to the City payroll. This exchange had advantages for CEOC and
the hospital. CEOC was able to put one organizer, formerly on the CEOC
payroll, onto the family planning grant payroll and thus was able to use
the salary for other purposes. The hospital, by paying for the administrator
and moving his office to the hospital, obtained much more control over the
program.
The administrator's job was never clearly defined by the Health Com-
missioner. After the administrator had been on the job a few months, he
wrote his job description, in which he called himself Director of Neighbor-
hood Health Services and in which he mentioned that he was to supervise
and direct health station activities, and establish policies with the Chiefs
and the Hospital Director. Nobody, however, seemed to see him in this
light. He had no authority to exercise his powers. The Chief of Pediatrics
did not communicate with him, the Chief of Medicine did not respond to his
requests to improve physician coverage, the Welfare department did not
respond to his attempts to negotiate for third party payments, and the
Hospital Director did not sign the personnel papers of several people he
had hired.
The project administrator held this frustrating job for about a year
before it was phased out. Responsibilities for licensing the health stations,
ordering supplies, taking care of housekeeping and heat were given to a
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hospital "unit manager," who has no responsibility for policy setting. The
responsibilities of setting policy and program direction have not been
assigned to anybody.
One responsibility the project administrator did not have was the
administration of the Neighborhood Family Care Center, the Model Cities
health center. The administrator for that health center was hired by the
NFCC board. When the Model Cities money ran out, the administrator had to
resign. The NFCC does not have another administrator and the City has not
assumed responsibility for providing any administrative services there.
3. Coordinated Team Care. Both a national and a local goal of neigh-
borhood health center proponents was the provision of comprehensive, acces-
sible care to low-income people. Health care delivery was to be provided
by a team consisting of a nurse practitioner, psychiatric nurse, social
worker, and physician. The fragmented leadership of the Cambridge-health
station program, however, makes such coordination extremely difficult,
even within individual health stations. Despite the many directors who
control pieces of the program, there is enough flexibility so that with
one exception, coordination does take place within the health stations to
the satisfaction of all the staff. The one exception is that pediatric
and adult nurse practitioners do not meet to discuss cases where both a
parent and a child are being treated. Since there are no family records,
and since the Chief of Pediatrics does not encourage joint consultation,
communication between the adult and pediatric nurse practitioners is on
an informal basis.
In terms of coordination with other hospital departments, the problems
are much more serious. When a patient is referred to the outpatient de-
1 ,l0l 1 l ,11111 h ll
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partment from the neighborhood health stations, a copy of the patient's
medical record is sent too. Usually, the attending physician does not
put the statement of the diagnosis and treatment in the medical record.
The nurse practitioner often has to retrieve the medical record and the
physician's statement herself.7
Patients who use the Emergency Room may tell the adult nurse practi-
tioner that they went to the ER. If they do not tell her, she has no way
of knowing, since the discharge summaries are rarely returned to the health
stations for inclusion in the patient's medical record.8 The Chief of
Pedia.trics makes sure that the parents of all children who use the ER are
contacted by the pediatric nurse practitioner and encouraged by her to
use the health stations instead of the ER for routine care. The Chief
of Pediatrics makes sure the pediatric nurse practitioners know who from
their neighborhood uses the ER each. day. As a re-sult, inappropriate ER
usage by children living near neighborhood health stations has decreased
9
considerably in the past few years. Inappropriate use of the ER, use of
both the ER and the neighborhood health station for routine care, and the
difficulties of encouraging patients to use neighborhood health centers
instead of emergency rooms have been documented in other neighborhood
health center systems.10,11'1 2 While the Chief of Pediatrics has taken
steps to address this problem, the Department of Medicine has not made
this problem a priority. The Medicine Department is bigger than the Pedi-
atric Department, and the 'effort needed to address the problem would be
much larger. The nurse practitioners do not have time to check through
the ER discharge summaries every day to look for patients, and the ER
staff does not send the summaries to the health stations.
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Coordination of patient care between the inpatient service and the
neighborhood health stations has been poor for the past two years. If
neighborhood health station patients are admitted through the Emergency
Room, neither the ER nor the inpatient service has sent a report to the
nurse practitioner. The nurse practitioners have spent a considerable
amount of time trying to find physicians to inform them of what is happening
to the patients so that they could provide follow up care. Often patients
have been discharged to the Outpatient Department for care, even though
they are regular health station patients. Coordination with the lab also
has been poor. Lab reports have often not been sent back to the health
stations, thus making it necessary for the nurse practitioner to spend
time at the hospital tracking down records and reports.
The Neighborhood Health Services Committee has not found an effective
way to provide for coordination or communication among the different de-
partments on these issues. The Chief of Pediatrics did not attend committee
meetings until the fall of 1975 when he was made chairman. No minutes
have been kept and few decisions have been made.
4. Expansion. Several of the health stations have long waiting lists
for appointments, several are not taking any new patients and one is ter-
ribly overcrowded. Money has been included in the budget for additional
staffing and for expansion. However, nobody is clearly responsible and
accountable for making and implementing expansion plans.
The Chief of Medicine and members of the citizen's advisory board
decided in 1973 that the Riverside neighborhood needed a health station.
Little planning took place beyond the decision that the neighborhood com-
munity center would be a good location. Nobody remembers who decided to
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put the health station on the second floor, but neither the State Public
Health or Public Safety Department will license the health station because
it does not have an elevator. When the health station was built, the
director of the community center and the nurse practitioner supervised
the building of the health station. No assistance came from the Cambridge
Hospital.
The Cambridgeport health station is in an elderly housing project
antd shortly after it opened, the residents of the building demanded that
no neighborhood people from outside the building be allowed to use the
health station. The dispute about who should use the health station was
finally resolved by the Cambridge Housing Authority so that the entire
neighborhood could use the health station. However, demands by residents
of the building for priority over other neighborhood residents did not
cease, and eventually the nurse practitioner resigned. Discussion of
opening another health station in elderly housing in North Cambridge does
not consider the problems of Cambridgeport.
The adult health station at the M.E. Fitzgerald School is severely
overcrowded. Money has been in the budget to move this health station
to a bigger area for two years, yet no relocation has taken place. The
North Cambridge residents prepared a plan indicating where they would want
the health station to move. The plan was approved by the planning depart-
ment and by the Health Commissioner. Neighborhood residents identified
possible locations. The Hospital Director prevented the project administra-
tor from acting to secure any of these places, stating that either a group
practice or a small health station in an elderly housing project (not at
all centrally located, but considerably more inexpensive) would probably
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replace the health station in the M.E. Fitzgerald School. Eventually, the
City Council asked the City Manager to intervene, and he requested the
hospital to begin negotiations with the landlords of the buildings suggested
by the residents of North Cambridge. Nobody implemented this directive.
Summary of Issue #1 Relationship of Neighborhood Health Stations
with the Cambridge Hospital.
Each of the areas discussed regarding the relationship of the neigh-
borhood health stations with the Cambridge Hospital - medical backup,
administrative control, coordinated team care, expansion - share certain
common characteristics. In-all areas, the support from the hospital in
the adult health stations has been inadequate. Lack of hospital support
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is not unusual in neighborhood health station programs. The leadership
is highly fragmented, responsibilities and jurisdictions are ambiguously
delineated, and hospital personnel deny responsibility themselves as well
as deny it to other staff. There is no one to whom the Chiefs are account-
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able. While such conflict is not unusual, the result is an increased
inefficiency of the program and a severe strain on the nurse practitioners
who have to deal with the consequences of diffused leadership, but can not
do anything about it. Several factors contribute to the behavior of
various hospital doctors. Some do not want to give up any of their pero-
gatives to cooperate with other departments in an effort to provide coord-
inated, comprehensive care. Others regard the neighborhood health station
program as a threat to the business of other departments (i.e. the Out-
patient Department) and are thus reluctant to refer patients. Some simply
do not know about the program. Some personnel feel that cost is a critical
issue and are reluctant to spend money on a program which does not pay for
61.
itself. While those who may have the time to run the program do not have
the authority, department heads who do not have the time to run an inpatient
service and a neighborhood health station program have decided to put their
priorities on inpatient service. Although there does not seem to be time
for the Chief of Medicine to run both an inpatient and outpatient service,
other Chiefs have no trouble. The program, which serves about 2500 patients,
is too small to have full time physicians.
The current administrative stiucture produces a program which is
poorly run. Whenever a crisis occurs, the City Council Subcommittee on
Health and Hospitals intervenes to force somebody to deal with the immediate
problems. Usually, this intervention results in a solution to the immediate
problem, but rarely produces or initiates a process within the Health De-
partment or hospital which will deal with problems on an ongoing basis or
which will provide leadership. The one exceptionto this pattern occurred
at the end of January, 1976, when the City Manager, at the request of the
Council Subcommittee, authorized the appointment of a health station direc-
tor. However, by March 1976, hospital personnel had not begun the process
of searching for a director.
B. Neighborhood Health Station Financing Mechanisms.
1. Federal. OE0, through the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee,
funded most of the neighborhood health station program through the first
year (OEO provided $115,000, the City $35,000). This money went to the
Neighborhood Family Care Center, the North Cambridge Health Station, and
the Donnelly Field Health Station. In the following years, OEO, and then
HEW, through a family planning grant, funded the neighborhood health stations
at $115,000 for one year (73-74) and then at a level of $70,000 per year.
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The regional HEW office considers the Cambridge neighborhood health station
program a model program, and gives Cambridge top priority. The decrease
in the size of the grant was not due to regional disinterest, but rather
due to decreasing appropriations from Congress. The regional office has
always informed CEOC of impending budget cuts early - considerably before
the City Council votes on its budget - and occasionally has been able to
fund the program above the expected budget. Nonetheless, federal funding
under the family planning grant is decreasing. At this point the HEW
regional office feels that Cambridge can receive no more than $57,000 for
1976-77, and that the $13,000 difference will not be made up later on in
the year. The Ob-gyn and Pediatrics departments have applied for a large
HEW maternal and infant care grant for the health stations, but no funding
has been guaranteed.
The Neighborhood Family Care Center has received a great deal of
Model Cities money, approximately $117,000 in 1973, for example. Model
Cities board members, who are also NFCC board members, have guaranteed the
NFCC money every year. However, when Congressional appropriations ceased,
Model Cities had no money to give the NFCC board. The cutoff in federal
funding forced the NFCC board to fire most of its staff. The board has
not secured funding from any other federal source, and the City would prefer
that the board divest itself of policymaking and executive responsibility,
and become an advisory board.
2. State. Neither the adult health stations nor the Neighborhood
Family Care Center recover any payments from third party reimbursements,
primarily because third party payers do not generally cover services de-
livered by nurse practitioners without direct physician supervision. Direct
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physician supervision means that a physician is on-site at all times the
15
nurse practitioner sees patients. Other health centers recover Medicaid
payments without having complete on-site physician coverage, but the Med-
icaid office has refused to issue Cambridge a vendor number. Discussions
with the Medicaid office on this issue began several years ago and no
agreements have been reached, partially because the issues have become
polarized and both sides are unyielding, and partially because the neigh-
borhood health station program is so disorganized.
Lack of physician coverage in the health stations was not the only
obstacle to third party payments. Until 1975, most of the health stations
had been operating without licenses or certificates of need because no one
at the hospital had assumed responsibility for procuring the Department of
Public Health and Department of Public Safety licenses. The health stations
still do not meet several Medicaid requirements. The Dept. of Public
Welfare does not consider a health station system where each Chief of Ser-
vice controls a piece of the program adequate leaderhip. The lack of
leadership was emphasized to the Medicaid office, not only by the organi-
zation charts Cambridge presented, but by the fact that several hospital
employees separately went to the Medicaid office to apply for vendor numbers.
Each claimed he was in charge, and each described the health station program
differently. Given these circumstances, the reluctance of the Medicaid
office to issue a vendor number is not surprising. Furthermore, the Medi-
caid office assessed the Cambridge program structure for citizen partici-
pation as being inadequate.
3. City. As federal funding for the health stations decreased, the
City has been asked to make up the difference and to provide additional
ll Ii' |1 |1,1 01 10 l
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money for expansion. During the first year of the neighborhood health
station program, the Department of Medicine provided the City's share -
$35,000 dollars. In working out the 73-74 budget, the Health Commissioner
received a commitment from the City Manager to provide three additional
staff positions (for nurse practitioners) above the first year's $35,000.
Taking into consideration an expected decrease in the OEO grant, increases
in the number of patients using the health stat-ions, and the need to provide
two additional health stations in Cambridgeport and Riverside, the Depart-
ment of Medicine estimated it would need about $200,000 from the City for
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18 months, or about $130,000 for twelve months. The City Manager at
first did not budget this increase, but CEOC, with help from the hospital,
organized a group of people who went to a City Council meeting and demanded
the increase. The City Council supported the people and the City Manager
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appropriated the money.
If CEOC and the Depaitment of Medicine had not informed the City
Council, the Council would not have been aware that by approving the City
Manager's budget, the program would have been cut. Under the City Manager
form of government, the power to make program decisions by choosing a
budget tends to reside with the City Manager, even though the City Council
can disapprove the budget proposal or request additional appropriations
or deletions prior to approval. The budget, however, has been presented
to the Council in line-item form, so the Council can not recognize what
programs are being added, mainLained, or deleted, by analyzing the budget.
In recent years, the City Council has paid much more attention to
the neighborhood health station budget. The City Council Health and Hos-
pital Subcommittee has held meetings at the hospital where the budget has
"'III "
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been reviewed and its contents discussed. City councilors have been able
to determine how many nurse practitioners they are voting to support. In
the past two years, hospital personnel have begun to separate the health
station budget from the hospital budget so that it becomes easier to see
exactly what services the City Council is buying. As a result of the
effort on 'the part of the hospital to define line-items and to provide
a program budget, and on the part of the City Council to participate more
actively in budget decisions the health station program always has a bud-
get. The City Council has always approved budget requests, even though
they have increased, and the City Manager has approved requests, because
the program constitutes less than 1% of the total budget, is highly visible,
and experiences high demand.
The City Manager has also approved line-item requests by the Neighbor-
hood Family Care Center for additional funding to tide them over until
they could secure more federal funds or until they could initiate a billing
system to recover some payments. These approved requests have amounted
to $50,000. Unfortunately, the NFCC has not recovered any third party
payments. Medicaid has refused to issue a vendor number for internal
medicine services because the NFCC has no full time physician director.
The NFCC had a vendor number for family planning services which elapsed
without the NFCC collecting any money. The primary reason for this was
that the hospital wanted to bill and collect from third party payers for
all services rendered at the health stations. The NFCC was asked not to
bill Medicaid itself, but to wait until the hospital was ready, and to
bill through the hospital. The hospital was not ready by the time the
vendor number elapsed.
Billing by the hospital was delayed for many reasons. There was a
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great deal of controversy and confusion over how much patients would be
billed for services, whether there would be a sliding scale, whether the
patient would receive a bill for the full amount, or the scaled down amount,
whether a patient could pay in cash, whether the hospital would take steps
to verify a patient's declared income, and whether billing would begin in
all health stations at once or one at a time. When the hospital was ready
to do billing, the City Council Subcommittee intervened and requested that
no billing begin until the citizen's advisory group, the Health Care Policy
Council, agreed to the system and until it could be implemented at all
health stations at the same time. No mutually agreed upon resolution has
been reached.
Summary of Issue #2 Financing Mechanisms.
Many neighborhood health center programs--not only Cambridge--have
experienced problems procuring third party payments, uncertainties of year-
by-year budget allocations, ambiguities of line-item budgets, and diffi-
culties stemming from the discretionary power of the City Manager over the
budget. 18,9 In Cambridge, decreasing federal allocations have put pressure
on the City to assume a greater share of the cost of the neighborhood health
station program and the City Council has appropriated increasing amounts of
money, primarily due to the City Council Subcommittee's belief that the
program is worthwhile. This conclusion of the Subcommittee stems from
their efforts to understand what kinds of programs are implied by the
budget request, and the political popularity of the program. Because the
neighborhood health. station budget has been separated from the hospital
budget, there is less incentive for the Hospital Director to cut the budget,
even though the money allocated to the program, especially personnel money,
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is not spent. Although the City Council and the City Manager are ready
to accept and to be responsible for this program which was financially
initiated by the federal government, the hospital has not acted to insti-
tutionalize the program. Many neighborhood health centers suffer for lack
of funding because cities are reluctant to assume financial responsibility
when federal money disappears. Cambridge is willing to make up for the
decreasing OEO/HEW money and to make up for decreasing Model Cities money
to the degree that all the health stations receive equal support. The
City could expand the program without additional appropriations, because
some money could be recovered through billing third party payers and those
patients who could pay something. Setting up the system to recover monies
requires a concerted effort on the part of the hospital, an effort which
has yet to be made.
C. Findings and Analysis.
The problems emerging from the discussion of neighborhood health
station issues in the last section are: the lack of a strong commitment
to neighborhood health stations in some hospital departments, the lack of
any clear authority responsible for making and implementing policy, and
the lack of accountability of the existing leadership which is highly
fragmented and autonomous. Absence of a strong commitment, either because
of disinterest or lack of time, results in inadequate hospital support.
Highly fragmented leadership means that there is no clear allocation of
responsibilities. Lack of accountability means that it is difficult to
alter anyone's behavior.
This section analyzes these problems for the City in administering and
setting policy for the health stations. The section is divided into three
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parts: 1) a discussion of those problems existing within the health stations
themselves which can be. changed and which the recommendations will address,
2) a discussion of those problems existing in the relationship between
the health stations and other groups or institutions which can be changed
and which the recommendations will address, and 3) a discussion of those
characteristics of the situation in Cambridge which may contribute to
problems, but which are givens, cannot be altered, and must be kept in
mind when making recommendations.
1. Problems within individual health stations.
Leadership is highly fragmented: no one individual is in charge of
the staff at each health station. Often, several people with conflicting
or competing interests claim the responsibility for staff supervision.
This problem is particularly acute at the NFCC, but exists at other health
stations too, because hospltal supervisors control pieces of the program
and no one knows who actually supervises and hires health aides. There
is no uniform hiring policy. Services are poorly coordinated. Some
hospital personnel discourage consultation between adult and pediatric
medicine, there is no central system of medical record keeping, referral
mechanisms between the health stations and other hospital departments are
poor. Adequate referral mechanisms could decrease the unnecessary Emer-
gency Room usage by health station patients. In the pediatric program,
the Chief of Pediatrics has been able to reduce unnecessary ER usage.
The existence of neighborhood health centers in other cities have resulted
20
in decreased ER usage. The pattern of health service delivery is not
always reponsive to community needs. The daytime hours, for example, make
it very difficult for employed patients to use the health stations. The
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long waiting lists make it difficult for new patients to enroll at the
health stations. Some studies indicate that travel times and waiting lines
are still significant barriers to health care for poor people.21 Accessi-
bility in terms of travel time has been shown to be extremely important in
bringing people into a health care system in other studies,22 and the
neighborhood health stations in Cambridge are certainly accessible to
patients in terms of travel time. Administrative improvements and expansion
could increase efficiency and bring more patients into the health stations.
For patients who are reluctant to use any kind of medical services at all
except in emergencies, an extensive outreach program at the Martha Eliot
Health Center in Boston has been very successful in bringing patients into
the health center.23 Similar outreach efforts cannot happen in Cambridge
so long as outreach worker positions are left unfilled.
The health station program is financially unstable because no billing
system exists, no one is~ actively and consistently searching for additional
funding, efforts to structure the program to be compatible with existing
requirements for reimbursement have not yet met with success, no one is
lobbying for change in the reimbursement requirements, and no one is
working actively to increase the efficiency of the program. Financial
instability is a characteristic of many neighborhood health station pro-
grams and some observers feel that comprehensive national health insurance
is the only solution to these financial problems.
2 4
2. Problems in the relationship between the neighborhood
health stations and other groups and institutions
The most basic and serious problem in the relationship between the
health stations and other groups and institutions, especially the hospital,
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is that there is no clear assignment of responsibilities, and no mutually
agreed upon neighborhood health station program director. Hospital leader-
ship is fragmented and uncommitted. The problem of lack of leadership is
exacerbated by the lack of established communications channels among all
the groups.
Cambridge Hospital. Nobody is responsible for negotiating and imple-
menting policy agreements between the health stations and the hospital
regarding medical backup, referral patterns, administration, or expansion.
Hospital personnel do no take responsibility for the adult program them-
selves, but at the same time deny the necessary authority to others. There
is weak, ineffective communication between the health stations and the
hospital. Some hospital personnel could not cooperate in a better referral
system because they do not even know the health stations exist. Others
resent the health stations because they feel money from their programs is
being siphoned off into the health stations, that the health stations are
diverting patients from the Outpatient Department, and that nurse practi-
tioners should not be practicing medicine. 25
These kinds of problems are not atypical. In his studies of neigh-
borhood health centers, Daniel Zwick found that "the development of
linkages and institutional relations that provide desirable support without
imposing unacceptable bonds remains one of the most difficult challenges
Established institutions have not provided the necessary management." 2 6
Community Groups. There is no mechanism for consumer participation
in decision making which affects the health stations. Citizens groups
exist--the NFCC Board, the Health Care Policy Council--but there is no
agreed-upon definition of the roles citizens' groups should play and what
kinds of issues they should address.
71.
The State. Different people representing different aspects of the
health station program represent the City in the negotiation process with
the Department of Public Welfare, and the Department of Public Health.
Such diversity lowers considerably the status of Cambridge in the eyes of
these agencies whose decisions clearly shape City programs. Furthermore,
these diverse and often conflicting views force the state agencies to
settle Cambridge's problems, and increase the chance of a solution or
determination which is not necessarily in Cambridge's best interests.
Nobody represents the City's interest in the legislature, and occasionally
bills come up which could have substantial effects on the program.
The Region. The health stations have no way of relating to, in a
city-wide context, regional planning agencies. Different competing groups
present themselves at HEW with grant applications, making Cambridge look
disorganized in the eyes of regional administra'tors.
The Health and Hospital Board. The health station. program does not
relate at all to this Board, which is supposed to advise the Commissioner
on health policy. Since the Board is inactive in this role and there is
no Commissioner, the City Council Health and Hospital Committee has taken
the place of the Board in dealing with the health stations. Such an
arrangement will be problematic when a Commissioner is hired, and when
the Board assumes responsibility.
The City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee. This committee
cannot make definitive, binding policy, because it has no powers of imple-
mentation, except indirectly through the City Manager. These powers tend
to be used only in crises. The City Council,. however, can insure City
funding of health stations, and has done so. The City Council, though,
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should not be the main advocate of the program, which needs a strong voice
from within the Health and Hospital Department. (See further discussion
in Chapter IV of this group.)
The City Manager/Commissioner. The City Manager delegates the
responsibility for the Health Department and its budget to the Health
Commissioner, who has in the past delegated most of the responsibility for
the hospital and the health stations to the Hospital Director. The
Commissioner has, in the past, served as a stronger health station advocate
than the Hospital Director, but did not become involved in the direct admin-
istrative problems which cause ao much trouble today. The health stations
need an advocate within the Health Department.
Community Development Office, Planning Department. These offices have
technical and planning skills that could be of assistance to those who run
the health station program, but since there is'no formal communication and
no program leadership, this possible connection does not exist, and the
skills are used in other areas and departments.
3. Givens
Highly fragmented leadership, ambiguous division of responsibilities,
lack of accountable leadership, lack of program support (either because of
disinterest or insufficient time to handle both inpatient and outpatient
services), and lack of coordination among the hospital departments, are
problems which can be addressed. The difficulty lies in finding a mech-
anism which not only addresses the problems, but which will be effective.
Therefore, as a first step to making realistic recommendations, this section
examines those characteristics of decision making which are present in
Cambridge and which cannot be changed.
73.
The nature of the health station program is highly political and
medical professionals resist entering the political arena. Other neighbor-
hood health center programs share this characteristic. According to one
researcher of neighborhood health centers nationally: "Since the community
health center was a strategy for restructuring the medical care system
within the broader purpose of reintegrating an alienated population into
the political and social fabric of society, the task of establishing and
legitimizing this institution has been especially difficult." 2 7
Another reason why the health center program is political, is that
the program is run by a city hospital, and ultimate policy control over
the institution belongs to the City Council, a political body.
Gordon has found however, that "members of the medical professions,
among others have tended to deny the political dimensions of health care."28
In his study of the neighborhood health center 'program in Denver, Hollister
found that program administrators attempted to keep the program away from
political pressures.29
The same can be said of Cambridge. Many hospital personnel resent
what they consider interference in hospital business from the City Council
and from citizen's groups. Whether Council involvement in hospital opera-
tions is justified depends on one's perspective. Physicians may believe
that they know best how to deliver medical care and how to define the
public need for medical care and that the City Council does not have that
expertise. On the other hand, the City Council can also represent the
public interest, because the City Council is accountable to the public
while physicians are not.
Why medical professionals would resist entering into the political
arena is suggested by Norton Long, who, from his studies of power in local
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communities, (particularly Boston), infers that the activities of any
community are undirected, and determined by the way in which groups coop-
30
erate to protect their self interests. The self-interest which many
medical professionals wish to protect is of the kind Eliot Friedson
describes, a desire to maintain their status as knowledgeable experts,
who by virtue of their medical skills, have been able to dominate decision
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making in the medical area. To enter the political process 'in the neigh-
borhood health station program poses a direct threat to this self-interest.
Whether physicians' self-interest is based on their confidence in their
expertise, their desire to preserve their autonomy, or some mixture of
both is difficult to determine. Certainly, a physician may be justified
in telling a consumer that he or she does not have the expertise to discuss
certain medical issues. However, the fact that department Chiefs do not
consult with each other on the establishment of a health service which
ideally would need coordinated services3 2 indicates that the autonomy of
individual services is an issue. Furthermore, while consumers may not have
the expertise to make medical decisions, they do know what kinds of ser-
vices they would like, whether providers are sensitive to cultural norms
and what hours are convenient for them to use the services. Some physicians
are reluctant to acknowledge community expertise in these nonmedical areas.
Regardless of the preferences of medical professionals, however, the
nature of the neighborhood health station program and the structure of
Cambridge City government inevitably place the program in a political
context. The City Council, accountable to the public, ultimately controls
policy at the City hospital. Since the health station program has a fairly
sizable and vocal constituency, and since the City Council Health and
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Hospital Subcommittee Chairperson is favorable toward the idea of neigh-
borhood health stations staffed by nurse practitioners, the Council will
inevitably respond to its constituency and intervene when the program is
not running well. Since the Council's crisis intervention has not resulted
in a process which will provide for a more responsibly run program, the
Council is attempting to build a process which will deal with the program
on a continual basis by authorizing the City Manager to hire a program
director and by choosing a new Health Commissioner and hospital board who
will be concerned with community health.
A second given in this particular situation lies in the nature of
decision making. In the Cambridge Health Department there is no unilateral
decision making process with regard to neighborhood health stations where
executive orders are handed down to administrators. The one who could
issue orders would be the Commissioner, and that position is vacant. While
the City Manager can issue executive orders, he has too many responsibilities
to see that they are carried out. Thus, the Chiefs are accountable to no
one. As a result, the implementation of any decision requires voluntary
cooperation from them.
Research on the politics of public programs in fields other than
health may help to explain the political dynamics at play with regard to
the Cambridge neighborhood health program. This research literature should
be illuminating to the extent that the programs studied are similar in
significant ways to the Cambridge neighborhood health program.
Analysts of poverty programs and of health administration have tended
to find the decision making process taking on these characteristics: The
process was competitive, where groups openly vied for power, or cooperative,
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where groups used bargaining, cooptation, or coalition building as a way to
gain control over resources, or exclusion, where any kind of interaction
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or transaction was avoided by those who wanted to maintain power.
Bachrach and Baratz have tended to emphasize the nondecision, or exclusion-
ary aspect of exercising power whereby powered groups prevent decisions
34from being made which might adversely affect them.
All of these characteristics of political decision making have been
evident in the decision making process of the neighborhood health station
program. An example of cooptation was the Commissioner's decision to move
the project administrator from CEOC and into the hospital. Exclusionary
tactics characterize the behavior of hospital-personnel toward the commun-
ity. In the fall, 1975, no members of community groups were included in
meetings of the Neighborhood Community Care.Committee (the committee of
Chiefs). When the City Manager requested (as i result of citizen and City
Council pressure) that a neighborhood health station program director be
hired, this Committee met to discuss the request. The representative of
the Health Care Policy Council who attended the meeting with permission
of the City Manager, was not allowed to speak, let alone vote. The deci-
sion at this meeting was not to hire a director. Thus, policy statements
coming out of the City Manager's office are sometimes completely undermined
by those who must implement them, a characteristic not uncommon in other
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implementation processes.
Because decisions can so easily be undermined, the major means of
decision making is bargaining, a process in which neighborhood health
station advocates have a weak role. An illustration of their weakness is
the discussion of billing policy. After having met with members of the
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Health Care Policy Council, and hearing their opinions about what would con-
stitute a desirable billing system, the hospital personnel proceeded as
they had originally intended until they were stopped by the City Council.
The kind of bargaining process which assumes the need for consensus
decision making and assumes the need for parties with different values to
reach a common ground by giving up some values and compromising, has been
called the process of "partisan mutual adjustment" by Charles Lindbloom. 3 6
The process of partisan mutual adjustment has not always been used
successfully. Frieden and Kaplan, in their study of the politics of Model
Cities legislation, found that this process watered down the legislation
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so much as to make it ineffective. Consensus decision making diluted
and undermined a distinct, coherent program drawn up by rational academics
and planpers.38 Frieden and Kaplan suggest that Model Cities failed
because Model Cities advocates within the natidnal bureaucracy were not in
powerful enough positions or did not have powerful enough allies to hold
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onto the major pieces of the program during the negotiation process.
Consensus decision making is not necessarily an evil which can or
should be eliminated. A more authoritarian system could be totally
unresponsive to the public interest, and substituting authoritarian
neighborhood health station advocates for inpatient service advocates may
be replacing one imbalance with another imbalance. Furthermore, the
chances of someone undermining a decision would seem to be less in a
consensus, rather than an authoritarian model.
The necessity of accepting a partisan framework with consensus
decision making as a given is eloquently expressed by Marris and Rein in
their analysis of community action programs.
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Any interested party has the right to propose reform--the mayor,
a social welfare agency . . . the poor themselves. None of
these is obliged to concern himself primarily with the needs of
so.ciety as a whole; he is partisan. Disinterested reformers,
whose concern is not constricted by any jurisdiction, can only
influence this "partisan mutual adjustment," if they too, become
in a sense, partisan,--even though their stake in the outcome is
different. Since their right to ally their resources to any
interested party is questionable, they may represent their purpose
rather as seeking a new form of fairer accomodation. But there
is a crucial distinction between innovations which try to give a
particular issue more constructive expression, and those which
try to create a means to arbitrate between all manner of needs.
They (Community action projects) tried to establish means, not only
to give expression to a variety of needs, but to determine the way
in which those needs should be reconciled. And this, we suggest,
no one in American society has the power to do. . . . A disinter-
ested reformer, just because he is disinterested is easily misled
into searching for such a non partisan framework within which all
conflicts cannot be resolved. But the attempt to create a non
partisan framework collapses for lack of any secure and truly
representative basis within the community power structure from
which to promote it.4 0
Consensus decision making is a given in Cambridge. According to the
new City health ordinance, to be in effect in spring or summer of 1976,
the Commissioner of Health must reach consensus with the Health and Hospi-
tal Board of Trustees (to be renamed Health Policy Board) concerning
matters of health policy. Until the ordinance is passed and goes into
effect and a new Health Commissioner is hired, things will continue as
they are now, with the Hospital Director in the awkward position of having
to find common ground between the Chiefs and the City Council.
Consequently, consensus decision making is a given and acknowledgment
of this process must be implicit in any set of rational planning recom-
mendations.
The difficulty with consensus decision making in matters concerning
the neighborhood health station program is that neighborhood health station
advocates have a weak role in the bargaining process.
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Keeping in mind Frieden and Kaplan's and Marris and Rein's interpre-
tations of the failures of the OEO and Model Cities poverty programs,
recommendations of this report will take as givens the partisan political
nature of the community and of the decision making process and will try to
give one issue, neighborhood health, more constructive expression by
strengthening its advocates within the system. Polsby has suggested that
power is in the hands of those who are the leaders in the decision making
process. At the moment, those leaders are the Chiefs. Recommendations
of this report will give neighborhood health center advocates some power
so that they will have a stronger role in the bargaining process. While
a strong neighborhood health station advocate may be able to take a
leadership role in deciding what happens in the individual health stations,
the nature of the coordination between the hospital and the health stations
will depend on how well the different departmehts coordinate and cooperate
with each other. Taking into consideration the possibility that the adult
neighborhood health station program has been a low priority because the
leaders have had insufficient time to run both an inpatient and outpatient
service, the recommendations will suggest full-time leadership responsi-
bilities for the health stations. Taking into consideration the additional
possibility that lack of service coordination and department cooperation
in the neighborhood health station program has resulted from the desire of
medical professionals for autonomy, the recommendations will suggest a
mechanism whereby department Chiefs become accountable for their actions
and whereby Health Department policy decisions must take into account'the
public interest.
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No recommendations will be suggested which expect to resolve con-
flicts between patients and providers, between research-oriented phy-
sicians and service-oriented physicians, between male physicians and
female nurse practitioners, and between those who would contain the
budget and those who would expand the scope of care. These conflicts are
characteristic of the health delivery system and cannot be easily recon-
ciled. Rather the recommendations accept these conflicts and try to
strengthen the position of neighborhood health station advocates by giving
them a stronger role in the bargaining and compromise process.
liii
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IV. THE ROLE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN THE
NEIGHBORHOOD HEALTH STATION PROGRAM
This chapter discusses the role of citizen participation in the
neighborhood health station program, specifically with regard to issues
of administrative control over hiring, financing (billing) and expansion.
The role of three citizen's groups will be reviewed: the Health Care
Policy Council, the Neighborhood Family Care Center Board, and the North
Cambridge Health and Social Services Committee.
Each discussion will include an indication of who participates; how
the groups became organized; what are their interests and powers; how
they gain (or do not gain) legitimacy; how they coordinate or do not
coordinate with each other; what are the nature and sources of the role
they currently play; and finally, how their role has helped bring about
institutional change of the health delivery system or the redistribution
of power.
A. Health Care Policy Council. Late in 1972, when the previous
City Manager would not grant the $135,000 budget request for the health
station program, CEOC organized a large group of people who demanded that
the City Council not approve the budget until the neighborhood health
station program had been reinstated. Out of this group, called the
Neighborhood Health Stations Crisis Coalition, evolved the Health Care
Policy Council. The group was organized in April 1973 by CEOC and the
Department of Medicine to act as an advocacy group for the health stations.
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The Department of Medicine played a big role in forming the group and
determining its structure, in a manner similar to the departments of
Medicine in other areas who organized community groups, not because they
necessarily believed in citizen participation, but because they saw
1
citizens as potential allies in the budget process. The advantage to
the Department of Medicine in having such a group is that the nieghborhood
health station budget would be protected from potential cuts by the Hospi-
tal Director, Commissioner and City Manager, and the group could help
pressure the hospital to accept the program. While the intentions of the
Department of Medicine may have been to provide the best possible structure
for citizen participation, the proposal endorsed was that the group agree
to assume advisory status, rather than incorporate and request shared
control of the funds and policy making power with the hospital. Reasons
given for the original proposal were: that it was unwise to ask the City
for the funds to pay for four corporations--one for each health station--
because the population base was not big enough to justify it; that the
group could not be within the structure of the Health Department and have
actual policy making power, because that power rested with the Board of
Trustees; and finally, that there was nothing unsatisfactory about advisory
status, because the Department of Medicine had a firm commitment to citizen
participation.2
Several considerations counter this position. Incorporation is not
very expensive and would no.t be a financial burden on the City, although
clearly, the City could not and should not be expected to pay a group to
share its power. There are financial sources other than the City. One
group raised its incorporation money from a bake sale. The size of the
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population base necessary to justify a neighborhood corporation is diffi-
cult to determine, and the population base of the Neighborhood Family
Care Center Corporation is not necessarily the best standard against which
to gauge the appropriateness of incorporated boards in other neighborhoods.
Theoretically, a neighborhood which is big enough to have a health center
should be big enough to have an incorporated board. The more relevant
question is how many, if any, health centers the population base justifies
The Department of Medicine assumed (and many have questioned this assump-
tion) that Cambridge needed a total of five neighborhood health stations.
While five boards might well be unwieldy, the idea of one incorporated
board for all five did not receive consideration.
In addition to the considerations just mentioned, the power to set
policy did not reside with the Health and Hospital Board of Trustees, but
rather with the Commissioner, who could have been asked to delegate some
of his authority. In Boston, the Board of Trustees does delegate some of
its authority with respect to neighborhood health programs. Lastly, a
personal commitment on the part of one physician does not commit the rest
of the institution, and certainly does not commit his department after he
leaves.
The actions on the part of the Department of Medicine are cooptive--
whether consciously or unconsciously--in that a group was given a place
in the institutional setting, but given no power or authority. How much
of a voice the group had in decisions depended upon the good faith of
those in power, and while the physician in the Department of Medicine
responsible for the neighborhood health stations remained in his job he
negotiated in good faith with the Health Care Policy Council.
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In June 1973, the Health Care Policy Council adopted a structure
and a set of bylaws. The Council was to have three elected representatives
from each health station neighborhood and was to assume the following
responsibilities in cooperation with the Department of Medicine: review
of the budget, review and approval of all funding applications, determining
priorities of need, i.e. new programs, types of service, hours of service,
developing personnel guidelines, interviewing the top three candidates for
3
nonprofessional positions, approving the hiring of professionals.
The Health Care Policy Council participated effectively in none of
the areas mentioned in the bylaws. Large numbers of citizens do not seem
interested in participating in the group on an on-going basis, while a
smaller number (approximately 8) consistently attend meetings. This small
group is not interested in amassing power or completely controlling the
health station program. Rather, the members seem to prefer that the hos-
pital take the responsibility for running the program. They are interested
in having a say in only a few decisions, and basically would prefer to stay
out of hospital affairs unless there is a crisis or a major decision to be
made. Attendance at Health Care Policy Council meetings has, until early
1976, been quite low. As a crisis over leadership and staffing came to a
head, more people attended meetings. When the Council and its staff were
able to choose strategies to reach their goals, attendance became consis-
tently high (approximately 15). Before this event, however, three rep-
resentatives from each neighborhood were rarely present. The Council has
not had any elections in several years. Many patients do not know about
the Health Care Policy Council, and most do not care, unless the health
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station program is directly threatened. This kind of group, fairly
passive, isolated from the rest of the community it represents and
4
without any authority, is not uncommon. The following examples, in the
areas of control over hiring, expansion, and financing, illustrate how
the role of the Health Care Policy Council has evolved.
1. Hiring. According to the bylaws, the Health Care Policy
Council is to interview the top three candidates for any nonprofessional
position. It is the intent of the HEW family planning grant that non-
professional personnel be hired from the community which houses the health
5
station. Hiring became the subject of a great deal of controversy,
resulting in tremendous antagonism between the hospital staff and the
Health Care Policy Council (HCPC). Often, when a vacancy occurred, some-
body would be hired, and the HCPC would not be informed. When the
physician from the Department of Medicine who worked with the HCPC resigned,
nobody from the hospital reguiarly attended HCPC meetings and few hospital
people communicated with the group. The HCPC directed its anger and resent-
ment at hospital personnel without any constructive result. The group
remained consistently unaware of vacant positions, so it could not always
request to be included in hospital decisions. The group voiced an opinion
after the individual was hired, but by then it was really too late for
them to do anything but antagonize the staff people responsible for the
hiring. The staff to the HCPC did not suggest a change of tactic. Rather
than suggest alternative strategies, he supported the group's actions. As
a result, resentment grew each time somebody was hired, but there was no
process for change. Citizens and professionals yelled at each other at
meetings and walked out on each other. Eventually, because of this
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situation and some other equally antagonistic circumstances (discussed
below) the nurse practitioner supervisor resigned. Several HCPC members
stopped attending meetings because the frustrations were too many and the
accomplishments too little. Other members simply lost interest in inter-
viewing personnel.
Present members of the HCPC want to- participate in planning and
hiring decisions which directly affect the health station program. They
want to help hire a director and they want to work out a way of obtaining
information about impending program decisions from the hospital. They
seem unconcerned about who the new Health Commissioner will be, although
she or he will have a significant influence on the program. While they
are concerned that nonprofessional personnel be hired to fill vacant
positions, they are not strongly interested in participating in that
process.
People lack interest for several reasons. This particular group of
people is not concerned with the neighborhood health station program as
a way of providing jobs for low income people, or as a way to acquire
power by controlling services which are for their use. Rather, they see
the neighborhood health station program as a way to gain access to quality
medical are. Consequently, their goals are more service oriented than
power oriented,contrary to the experience of the Neighborhood Family Care
Center, discussed later. Since the nurse practitioner provides the bulk.
of the health services, it makes sense that the HCPC is concerned that
there be adequate numbers of nurse practitioners.
The HCPC did become involved in hiring a nurse practitioner in
North Cambridge. The nurse practitioner had announced her resignation in
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July 1975, and announced that it would be effective on February 1, 1976.
When, by the end of January, 1975, nobody had been hired to replace her,
citizens stepped in. The HCPC arranged several meetings in North Cambridge
to inform patients that services would be sharply curtailed in February,
and to find out from the Hospital Director, the acting Chief of Medicine
and the Director of Nursing exactly what they intended to do about the
problem. All three never attended a meeting 'together, and at each meeting,
responsibility for finding a solution was delegated to whoever was absent.
A North Cambridge subcommittee of the HCPC informed the Chairperson of the
City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee, who submitted two motions
to the City Council, one asking the City Manager to find a solution to the
problem, and the other asking the City Manager to determine who was in
charge of the health stations. The City Manager was to meet with hospital
personnel and citizens to address these two issues. The City Manager
determined, at the request of the North Cambridge and City Council
subcommittees, that a nurse practitioner should be hired at a salary
competitive with other local (Boston) nurse practitioner salaries and that
a health station medical director, a physician, should be hired. Both
determinations were made at the request of the North Cambridge subcommittee
and the City Council Subcommittee. When the North Cambridge subcommittee
became aware that a nurse practitioner wanted the job, they informed the
City Manager so he could make sure that somebody in the hospital hired her.
This crisis has made the HCPC acutely aware that the Nursing Department
was not actively supervising and hiring nurse practitioners. Consequently,
the group is monitoring the hospital's progress in carrying out the City
Manager's directive to appoint a medical director, and taking steps to
insure representation on any screening committee.
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HCPC members who play the greatest role in this effort are those
from North Cambridge. The rest of the HCPC members have begun to realize
that what goes on in North Cambridge has implications for the rest of the
City program, and they have attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to prevent
similar crises elsewhere by demanding that the hospital begin training
other nurse practitioners. No nurse practitioner is assigned to the
Cambridgeport health station, but since the Neighborhood Family Care
Center is closed, their nurses are in Cambridgeport, and the absence of a
regular nurse practitioner will not result in a substantial reduction of
services until the NFCC reopens and the nurse practitioners return there.
2. Expansion. Issues of expansion have also created a great
deal of resentment and antagonism between hospital personnel and the HCPC.
The roles of the HCPC in decisions relating to program expansion have
varied.
The HCPC's role during the expansion of the program into Cambridgeport
had destructive results. In 1973, residents of the elderly housing project
which housed the health station claimed that only they were entitled use of
it, and other neighborhood residents disagreed. Members on the HCPC who
were supposed to be representing the entire Cambridgeport neighborhood
happened to be residents of the elderly housing and took the side of the
elderly residents. Because the HCPC itself was divided, it contributed to
the conflict, rather than to a resolution. The conflict between the
elderly housing residents and the other neighborhood residents still con-
tinues. Each nurse practitioner who has been hired for this health
station has resigned because she felt she could not work without another
nurse practitioner in a situation where there were so many demands on her
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time. The conflict over the use of the Cambridgeport health station has
not been incorporated in planning for other health stations, for there
is discussion, both at the hospital, and among elderly residents of North
Cambridge, of a health station in an elderly housing project in North
Cambridge.
The HCPC has tried to play a more effective role in more recent
decisions relating to the expansion of the health station at the M. E.
Fitzgerald School in North Cambridge. In 1974, members of the HCPC
prepared a plan indicating the need for expansion and a central neighbor-
hood location. Both the Health Commissioner and the Planning Department
approved the plan. HCPC members worked to make sure expansion money would
be in the budget. They talked to landlords and identified several possible
locations. As of March, 1976, no expansion had taken place. Relocation
of the health station is a necessity, since conflict with the School
Department has thwarted the possibility of extending health station hours
in the present location, even as a temporary expansion measure.
When the hospital had not hired a nurse practitioner to replace one
who had resigned, North Cambridge HCPC members turned their attention to
that issue. Since hospital personnel did not take the initiative in hiring
the nurse practitioner, and did not implement the expansion policy, HCPC
members are now focusing their attention on securing a neighborhood health
station director, who will be the health station advocate responsible for
implementing policy and dealing with problems of hiring and expansion.
3. Financing. The HCPC has been very interested in the subject
of billing. While members agreed that most patients could probably afford
to pay something for services, they wanted to be certain that any billing
i
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system did not deny patients financial access to care. They wanted to
participate in decisions the hospital made concerning the nature of a
billing system--specifically the structure of a sliding fee schedule,
the provision for patients to negotiate and pay the fee in the health
stations rather than the hospital, the provision that patients be billed
an adjusted fee rather than the full fee if they were on the sliding
schedule, and the provision that patients be able to pay cash for services
in the health stations rather than at the hospital. Hospital personnel
guaranteed that these preferences would be taken into consideration, but
never presented the HCPC with any plans or decisions. Rumors from the
hospital that certain fee schedules had been set would trickle down to
the HCPC, causing resentment toward the hospital personnel for not
including or informing them. Hospital personnel were often unavailable
to meet with the community to answer questions'or make joint decisions,
unless the City Council Subcommittee suggested a meeting.
At these meetings, the Subcommittee requested the hospital not to
begin a billing system until the HCPC had agreed to it. As of March, 1976,
a billing system had not been initiated. The primary reason for the delay
is that while hospital personnel have designed a billing system, they have
not explained the system to the HCPC and they have not demonstrated that
the system is responsive to the needs of the community (i.e., allowing
for cash payments at the health stations). The City Council Subcommittee
has requested that billing not begin until the hospital a.d the community
have come to an understanding of what a billing policy should entail.
Furthermore, the hospital would like to begin billing at one health station
at a time, and the HCPC and the City Council Subcommittee would prefer the
hospital to wait until it can begin billing all health stations at the same
time.
I
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Summary of Role of Health Care Policy Council
The Health Care Policy Council is a small advisory group, mainly
concerned with adequate delivery of services rather than acquisition of
power. While the Council is supposed to represent city-wide hea-lth
interests as a whole, most of the members have tended to be concerned
primarily with their individual neighborhoods. Many health station
patients are not aware of the HCFC or interested in it except when there
is a crisis. Crises tend to produce citizen participation on the HCPC,
and the form that this participation takes is open conflict with the
hospital which antagonizes hospital personnel and contributes to their
opposition to citizen participation. Conflict generally results because
the group has no formal, continuing relationship with the hospital. Resis-
tance of hospital personnel to the idea of citizen participation has dis-
couraged some citizens from participating in the program. Poor communi-
cation and misinformation contribute a great deal to the conflicts and
antagonism. Hospital personnel meet with the HCPC, not always of their
own volition, but on the urging of the City Council Subcommittee and the
City Manager, a situation which indicates the hospital's disinterest in
dealing with this particular group. The increasing number of crises and
hence the increasing concern of the HCPC and the City Council Subcommittee,
has resulted in both groups pushing, not only for solutions to immediate
problems, but also for the establishment of a process within the institu-
tional setting to deal with neighborhood health stations. The HCPC at
this point, is pushing for an institutional process in which they have an
advisory, or maybe a partnership, but not a controlling role. They are
not demanding a substantial change in the distribution of power, that is,
95.
they are not asking that power be transferred to them. The group has not
generally worked to bring about other kinds of changes, i.e. expanding
the program, or demanding new kinds of services, but rather has worked to
maintain the change (the initiation of the program) brought about by CEOC
and the Department of Medicine in the early 1970's and mandated by the
City Council. The hospital has not responded positively to this mandate,
and, in order to maintain the program, the group is insisting that a
medical director, who will act as an advocate for the program, be appointed.
This change has not yet come about. However, in determining the goal of
obtaining a medical director, and of precluding future crises of staff
shortages, and in defining a strategy to meet -these goals, HCPC members
have begun to see how they can accomplish something. Consequently, atten-
dance at meetings is much higher.
B. Neighborhood Family Care Center, Inc.
The Neighborhood Family Care Center is a health center in the Model
Cities neighborhood. Opened in 1968, it was the first neighborhood health
center in Cambridge. Unlike the other health stations, it is run and
controlled by the 18-member Neighborhood Family Care Center Board, a
corporation established and funded by the Model Cities Board. Control over
this health station has been a troublesome and controversial problem for
all who are involved. The issue is not how much say the Board can have in
policy set by the hospital, but rather whether the hospital or the Board
will make policy and control the health center. The City and the hospital
both feel that the NFCC Board is unqualified to run the health center, a
situation which makes it difficult for the hospital to provide services
there. The City wants to assume operating control and is asking the Board
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to accept an advisory status. An analysis of the role of this citizen
group will include a discussion of those issues which resulted in the
City's attempt to assume complete responsibility for the health center
and an analysis of the nature of the present controversy.
1. NFCC, 1968-75. Citizen Control. Although the Model Cities
legislation called for an advisory role for citizen's groups, ("widespread
citizen participation")6 and the Economic Opportunity Act called for a
7
greater role for citizens, ("maximum feasible participation") in social
service programs, the reverse occurred in Cambridge. While CEOC, the local
Community Action Agency, was willing to accept advisory status for the
Health Care Policy Council, the Model Cities Board and the Neighborhood
Family Care Center Board found advisory status unacceptable. The differ-
ences are perhaps accounted for by the professional leadership at the time.
The Department of Medicine strongly urged that'the citizen's group take
advisory status, while the Assistant City Manager supported Model Cities
neighborhood residents in their desire for control of the Model Cities
8
Board and supported them until they received control. Consequently,
control by the citizen's group was a given when the NFCC board was formed.
Many NFCC board members had been or were Model Cities Board members.
Some of the characteristics ascribed to the Model Cities Board in another
study9 also hold true for the NFCC Board. The most striking of these are
that the Board has no real base of support in the neighborhood, or account-
ability to neighborhood residents. There has been no new leadership on
the Board, because members tend to reelect themselves continuously without
electing anybody new. Furthermore, until 1975, nobody representing the
Spanish-speaking community, which is very large in this neighborhood, has
attended board meetings. The City and the Model Cities Board did not
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provide enough administrative help to put the health center in a finan-
cially stable position. One professional who helped organize the Model
Cities Board felt that lack of administrative support made it extremely
difficult for people who did not know much about how to run a health
10
center to run one well. Consequently, their power to provide health
care was limited.
Whether or not initial lack of administrative support caused
problems later, the administrative support in the health center has always
been inadequate. The person the Board hired did not deal with several
crucial problems. At the NFCC, the nonprofessional staff are accountable,
not to the nurse practitioners, but to the Board. The nurse practitioners
are accountable to the Nursing Department at the hospital, not to the
Board. As a result, health aides refused to take the family planning
counseling training course run by CEOC and offEred to other health aides,
on the grounds that they were not required to take orders from the nurse
practitioner, who asked that they take the course. The administrator did
not ease the tensions between the nurse practitioners and the staff, and
the Board did not interact with the nurse practitioners unless absolutely
necessary. Board members were very suspicious of any kind of professional,
and tended not to deal with them. The administrator wielded little power,
since all decisions were made by the Board, usually without any staff
consultation. Since the Board did not communicate regularly with the
staff, the Board was not always aware of problems existing in the health
center. The Board was neither aware of personnel problems or of the state
of the health center's finances. One reason they did not worry was that
the Model Cities Board, some of whose board members were on the NFCC Board,
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would always guarantee funds. Model Cities money was discontinued in 1975,
and the administrator did not look for other sources of money, nor did he
pay the outstanding debts. For example, although he deducted federal
income tax from employee's salaries, he neglected to send the deductions
to the federal government.
In addition, he did not take care of the physical repairs of the
building and often it was so cold that patients had to be examined with
their coats on. The housekeeping service was not running smoothly either,
and if.the nurse practitioners did not empty the garbage and clean the
health center themselves, no one did.
The City had a paradoxical attitude toward the NFCC. When it became
clear that the NFCC needed more money, the City Manager was willing to add
a line item to the budget for the NFCC, and the Commissioner supported
11
that decision. Although no contract was written and signed, the agree-
ment was that the NFCC would receive an additional appropriation provided
that it institute a billing process as soon as possible. The NFCC applied
for and received a vendor number for reimbursement of family planning
services, but was asked by the City and the hospital to wait until the
rest of the health station program had a billing service. Although the
NFCC is licensed as a free standing health center, and the other health
stations are licensed as part of the Hospital Outpatient Department, the
hospital personnel wanted all bills sent from the City, all payments sent
to the City, and some reimbursement sent back to the NFCC. NFCC Board
members preferred the money to come to the NFCC with a reimbursement sent
to. the City. This disagreement never came to a head because the NFCC did
not develop the capability to proceed without the hospital, and, as of
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March, 1976 the hospital was not ready to bill. Consequently, the NFCC
never collected any money.
Late in 1974, the NFCC fired its administrative director because
he did not address the financial problems and because the nurse practi-
tioners had been taken out of the health center when the head of the Nursing
Department decided the health center was too filthy to work in. The nurse
pract-itioners returned after the Board spent a weekend painting and
cleaning.' The Board did apply to Medicaid for a vendor nuniber to
receive reimbursements for all services, but the vendor number was denied
because there was no full time medical director.
During the spring of 1975, the Board tried to find another adminis-
trator, but they were unable to hire their first choices because Model
Cities only had enough money to support a director for six months. The
person whom they eventually hired proved unable to get the health center
back on its feet in the amount of time she had. In the late spring, most
of the NFCC staff were released because there was no money to pay them.
The nurse practitioners stayed at the health center, without interpreters
and health aides until the summer when they felt they could no longer
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work without any staff support. The health center closed and the nurse
practitioners were moved to other health stations.
2. NFCC. Fall 1975--the present time. During the period
described above, the building next door to the NFCC was being renovated
to become a health center. The new health center was to have been an
expanded and relocated version of the NFCC, controlled by the NFCC Board.
The renovations. were being paid for by a Neighborhood Facilities Grant
given by the Department of Housing and Urban Development to the City.
a
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The grant contained a contract which stated that although this
development would be undertaken by the City, the health center was to be
leased at no cost for 21 years to the NFCC. The operational funds and
services of the health center were to be the responsibility of the NFCC.
If it failed to carry out its responsibilities, the City could intervene
and take over the lease.1 3'1 4
In August 1975, the City Manager requested that the HUD regional
office change the sponsorship of the new center from the NFCC to the City
on the grounds that the NFCC had been unable to discharge its responsi-
bilities. He requested that the Cambridge Department of Health and
Hospitals be named the sponsor, and that an advisory board be established
with the help of the Human Services Coordinator in the City Manager s
15
office. On October 1, 1975, the City sent a letter to HUD confirming
16
the change in sponsorship. HUD had taken the position that the decision
to change a sponsor was up to the City, not up to HUD, because no change
in service was involved. Subsequently, the Cambridge City Solicitor gave
the opinion that the City was acting legally in terminating its contract
with the NFCC board.1 7
Meanwhile, the City acted upon its intent to sponsor the new facility
and on September 2, 1975, filed a certificate-of-need application with the
Department of Public Health. The NFCC Board also filed a certificate of
need application for the new facility, feeling that the City had no right
*to assume sponsorship. The Department of Public Health staff refused to
18
hear the NFCC application because it did not meet departmental requirements.
Although the Public Health Council staff did not consider the NFCC appli-
cation, it also felt that the "Cambridge Hospital lacks an effective
organization through which to facilitate community input for its
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neighborhood health services program." The Human Resources Coordinator
in the City Manager's office tried to work out an arrangement for an
advisory board with the two groups who were involved. In addition to the
NFCC Board, the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge had expressed an interest
in the NFCC. The Concilio represents Spanish speaking people in Cambridge
and has'an interest in the NFCC because of the high number of Spanish
speaking patients. The Concilio has demanded bilingual personnel at- the
NFCC and has negotiated an affirmative action policy with the hospital.
Provided that there was an affirmative action agreement, the Concilio was
willing to support the hospital's application.
The area 311 committee of the Health Planning Council of Greater
Boston (a group entitled to review and comment on certificate-of-need
applications) felt that adequate consumer input meant that the City appoint
an advisory board, the majority of whose members were consumers, including
at least one representative from the NFCC Board, the Concilio, Health
Care Policy Council, and the Health Planning Council of Greater Boston.2 0
The City Manager intended to appoint board members from lists submitted by
21
community groups. Because the City Manager had agreed to this mechanism
of establishing an advisory board, the Public Health Council staff recom-
mended to the Public Health Council that the certificate-of-need be
awarded to the Cambridge Hospital with the condition that all agreements
22
be implemented by March 10, 1976.
At the meeting of the Public Health Council, the NFCC Board opposed
this recommendation claiming that one of their board members on an advisory
board was not enough, and the City of Cambridge had no legal right to
reduce the board to an advisory status.
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The Public Health Council agreed and delayed issuing the certificate-
of-need to the Cambridge Hospital for another 60 days, or until such time
as the City and the NFCC Board came to an agreement. Members of the
Public Health Council wanted to know why the Cambridge Hospital was a
more suitable applicant, and voted not to hear the NFCC's application only
when the State Health Commissioner broke a tie vote. Members of the Council
expressed strong feelings in favor of the NFCC. They suggested that the
City had not demonstrated an ability to develop a substantial citizen
participation component at the other neighborhood health stations, and
that the NFCC's ability to run the health center for eight years demon-
strated its competence.
Summary of Role of NFCC, Inc.
The Neighborhood Family Care Center, Inc. is an 18-member board of a
Model Cities health center in one of the Cambridge Model Cities neighbor-
hoods. The Board is more concerned with the concept of community control
than with adequate delivery of services, and will fight for control, even
if the result is a long delay in the opening of the new facility and a
closing of the old one. The Board is not necessarily responsive to or
even aware of neighborhood needs, continually reelecting itself without
bringing on new members. The Board is highly suspicious of professionals
and consequently, has a difficult relationship, not only with the hospital,
but with its own administrator. The Board is unwilling to delegate authority
but also unaware of health center problems. Lack of the necessary adminis-
trative skills resulted in the Board's inability to take steps -to make the
health center financially stable before the Model Cities money ran out.
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One source of the Board's difficulties may be, that although they had the
power to run the health center, they do not have the skills, and support
did not come from the hospital, even in the areas where the hospital had
responsibility (i.e., activities of nurse practitioners). Threat of a
lawsuit over affirmative action, and threat of opposing the City's
certificate-of-need application are the only tools the Concilio has to
pressure the Department of Health and Hospitals into hiring bilingual
personnel who belong to minority groups. Although the City Council
Subcommittee raised the issue over a year ago, and requested that the
hospital take steps to address the problem, little was done. Allowing a
state body, such as the Public Health Council, to make a decision about
community control in Cambridge indicates Cambrdge's inability to resolve
these issues. Furthermore, a decision made by a group lacking a great
deal of information, such as the Public Health Council, may not necessarily
be a decision which meets Cambridge's needs.
C. North Cambridge lealth and Social Services Connittee, Inc.
The North Cambridge Health and Social Services Committee, Inc.
consists of a group of residents from Jefferson Park, a housing project in
North Cambridge. The group was formed about seven years ago for the pur-
pose of obtaining a health center and social service center in Jefferson
Park. The group was staffed by and received strong support from the
Department of Psychiatry at the Cambridge Hospital. The group has no
money. A doctor from the hospital Psychiatry Department, Harvard law
students, and architects have all donated their time. After several years
of ineffective negotiations with the hospital, the Health Commissioner
agreed to sign a certificate-of-need application for a health station in
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Jefferson Park. The Public Health Council refused to approve it unless the
Cambridge Hospital agreed to provide medical support. The Health Commis-
sioner signed the application just before he resigned, so there was no
one at the hospital to carry out plans for the health station, since the
Hospital Director was opposed to putting a health station in Jefferson Park.
The residents are committed to the idea of a health station and have nego-
tiated an agreement with the Cambridge Housing Authority, whereby the
Housing Authority will do the renovations necessary for the health station.
For several years, members of the North Cambridge Health and Social
Services Committee have refused to join the Health Care Policy Council,
because they felt that to belong to both groups constituted a conflict of
interest. Recently, however, they have come to realize that they share
many concerns with the Health Care Policy Council, especially the conern
that if the M. E. Fitzgerald adult health station has fewer than two nurse
practitioners, no nurse practitioner will be in Jefferson Park.
Like the Health Care Policy Council, and unlike the NFCC Board, this
committee is not conerned with control, but rather with adequate delivery
of health services. However, they do feel they need some clout in order
to make sure the hospital does not neglect the health station. They feel
the Health Care Policy Council is in a very weak position, and at the same
time, that the NFCC Board is exercising too much control.
After a long period of little response from the hospital in their
requests for equipment and a nurse practitioner (requests which had to
have a positive response before the Housing Authority would begin renova-
tions), a local politician from North Cambridge intervened and set up
several hospital meetings for the Jefferson Park group. The group wants
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to set policy for the health station, and then lease it entirely to the
hospital. The hospital will have the Department of Public Health license,
the certificate-of-need, and the responsibility for supervision of staff
and provision of medical services. If at any time, the hospital does not
deliver services according to the terms of the lease, the Committee can
terminate the contract and ask the hospital to leave. The hospital is
also entitled to pull out if the terms are not met. The group thinks its
ability to terminate a contract gives it power and policy control, but an
immediate problem is that if a contract is terminated, there will be no
health station unless the Committee finds another hospital. Furthermore,
no matter what happens, the Cambridge Hospital will hold the license.
However, once the contract is signed, the group will have trouble enforcing
their policy because they will have no say in the day to day operations.
Although the Hospital Director is about to sign the agreement, no extra
personnel exist to staff the health station.
D. Findings and Analysis
This section summarizes and analyzes the problems concerning the role
of citizen participation. The discussion is divided into several areas:
the interests and goals of citizens who want to participate; the impact of
citizen participation on the delivery of health services and on the politi-
cal or economic redistribution of power to poor people; the problems of
citizen participation in health issues, both within the groups themselves
and as they relate to other groups or institutions in Cambridge; and the
givens which any recommendations must acknowledge.
1. Interests and Goals of Citizens Who Participate-
The kinds of interests expressed by citizens who participate in the
neighborhood health station program are in many ways not unlike attitudes
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of citizens who participate in other neighborhood health programs. The
majority of citizens in Cambridge are unware of the existence of an
advisory council, uninterested or unable to participate in it. Such
23
unawareness and uninvolvement is not unusual in other communities.
Those Cambridge citizens who do participate express the same kinds
of interests as citizens in other places. These interests are primarily
in nonmedical areas. Sparer found that citizen participation interests
included "selection of key staff, service priorities, hours of service,
,24
budgets, and recruitment of outreach workers" and, case studies by Hollister
25
concluded that citizens were interested in primarily nonmedical matters.
Even though citizens on the Health Care Policy Council want to participate
in decisions concerning nonmedical matters, they have no voice in the
decision making process. For almost three years, they accepted this
passive role. Gordon found this kind of passivity to be common among
citizens' boards which were initated by hospitals. He feels that such
boards tend to be no more than rubber stamps of the sponsoring institution. 2 6
However, in early 1976, Health Care Policy Council members began to take
active steps to participate in the decision making process over nonmedical
matters. They have demanded a voice in the budget determinations and in
planning for the health stations' expansion. The City Council Subcommittee
is supporting them.
The NFCC Board is also interested in nonmedical matters, and since
the Board controls the health center its role is much less passive. The
North Cambridge Health and Social Service Committee is also interested in
nonmedical matters. Whether this group will have a voice depends on the
strength of. its contract with the hospital.
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Goals of citizens groups vary considerably. Hollister found that
citizens in Denver had either goals of improved service delivery or
increased community control, and, goals of achieving a board representative
of the community or achieving increased personal growth and development. 2 7
Cambridge is similar to Denver in that both situations exist. Like some
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of the citizens in Denver, and like the citizens Hillman studied, members
of the Cambridge Health Care Policy Council are more interested in quality
of service than in control. Unlike the citizens in*Denver, HCPC members who
are displeased with the health station program do not want increased control. 2 9
They would prefer that the hospital departments be reorganized so hospital
personnel can do a better job of running the program. They see their role
as being advisory, or perhaps as being a partner with the hospital in a
joint decision making process, but not as controlling the health station
programs. The North Cambridge Health and Social Services Committee feels
that control to the degree of having the option to close the health station
and find other providers will make the hospital more responsive. However,
this group would like the hospital to retain full administrative control.
Both groups, the Health Care Policy Council and the North Cambridge
Health and Social Services Committee are concerned that their boards be
representative. The Health Care Policy Council is concerned that an equal
number of representatives from each neighborhood sit on the Council, and
that these representatives be bona fide Cambridge residents, who have lived
in Cambridge and who are not transient students.
The NFCC Board operates under the other set of goals. Its members
are interested in community control to the point of threatening the delivery
of services.. They are interested in gaining control of aspects of their own
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lives which concern health matters, and in personal development at the
expense of neighborhood representation. The difference in goals between
the NFCC and the HCPC can be accounted for by the fact that the NFCC
Board grew out of the Model Cities Board, which was an independent board
controlling the Model Cities Program, and the Health Care Policy Council
grew out of efforts made by the Cambridge Hospital. Unfortunately in
this situation, no matter how cooperative and interested in citizen par-
ticipation hospital personnel might be, conflict will be inevitable unless
NFCC Board members change their goals.
2. ..Impact of Citizen Participation
Neither the NFCC nor the HCPC has been particularly successful in
attaining its goals. Analyses of poverty programs have suggested that a
poverty program tends to achieve either a redistribution of pcwer or an
increase in service delivery, but not both. A' study of poverty programs
in New York City and Chicago showed that in New York, people participated
in setting policy for and administering programs, but that they did not
receive substantial amounts of increased services, while in Chicago,
Mayor Daley did not allow citizens to control the poverty programs, but he
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provided substantial material benefits in the form of services. In his
study of community control, Altshuler concludes that control is the only
demand for poor people to make, since it allows them to be a legitimate
part of the political system, but at the same time, he observes that
"community control is a substitute for substantive changes" and that
community participation was frequently correlated with ineffective service
31delivery in OEO poverty programs.
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The applicability of these studies to the Cambridge situation is
limited for several reasons. The authors seem to imply a tradeoff between
service benefits and political power. In the case of the NFCC, a group of
citizens had full political power but did not use their power to run the
neighborhood health center. As a result, the health station stayed open
as long as there was Model Cities money to support it. However, after the
Model Cities money ran out, the group was not able to use its power to keep
the health center open. Thus the either/or situation--service benefits or
political power--appears to apply with regard to the NFCC. Had the NFCC
Board been interested in running a health center, the Board would have
hired good administrators and Board members would have attended meetings
in large enough numbers to assure a quorum.
However, analysis of the issue in terms of a tradeoff does not really
apply to the other health stations. The lack of community control
or even meaningful citizen participation was not accompanied by a high
level of service delivery. The health stations presently serve only
2,500 people, but the demand is much higher (six week waits for new
patients at most of the health stations). Service delivery was hindered
by the large number of staff vacancies left unfilled. If the City Council
and the Health Care Policy Council had not been involved in the health
station program, the adult program probably would have been phased out,
because hospital personnel did not provide adequate services. In a com-
munity where service delivery in the adult neighborhood health stations
is not a high priority in the executive offices, advisory citizen partici-
pation has not been effective by itself. Cooperation with efforts of the
City Council has been the only, and therefore, necessary pressure on the
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hospital to maintain the program. Although it has been demonstrated at the
NFCC that citizen control was not successful in insuring the delivery of
health services, it has also been pointed out that the citizens who make
up the NFCC Board are not representative of the neighborhood or of the
patients, do not have the necessary administrative skills to run the health
center, and appear to be more concerned with control as an end rather than
as a means of improved serivce delivery. However, the NFCC did stay open
as long as there was Model Cities money and did have a high number of
enrolled patients relative to the other health stations. The experience
of the other health stations indicates that citizen participation in some
form is necessary, at the very least, to insure some degree of accountability
within the health station program.
Thus, in terms of service benefits, an impact of citizen participation
was to assure the continuation of the health sfation program. Citizen par-
ticipation has had little impact in terms of increased political and
economic power for poor people. While health aid and receptionist positions
are supposed to be filled by people living within the health station
neighborhood, neighborhood people are not always hired and vacancies are
left for two or three months at a time. No nonprofessionals have been
employed at the NFCC since spring 1975. Political power of poor people
has not increased because the Health Care Policy Council has always had weak,
advisory status. The HCPC's failure to influence important decisions and
non-decisions indicates this. The NFCC Board is losing its control. The
North Cambridge Health and Social Services Committee has spent the last
seven years without a health station and without any control. The failure
32
of poverty programs to redistribute power is not unusual.
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The redistribution of power is an important issue with regard to the
NFCC since the Board may fight as long as it can to control the health
center. The issue is not so important to the HCPC whose members would
like the hospital to be actively responsible and accountable for the pro-
gram, but who would not want to assume control over it. They want to know
that their concerns--about locations of health stations, service mix, hours,
billing--be incorporated into the decision making process, but they are
searching for-a process short of control to guarantee this.
3. Problems of Citizen Participation
Citizen participation in the neighborhood health station program has
been a problematic, dissatisfying experience for both the citizens and
the hospital personnel. The most basic problem is that neither the Health
Department nor the citizen's groups have come to an understanding, either
separately or mutually, as to what the role of 'citizen participation should
be. Citizen s groups have a difficult time working with each other and an
even more difficult time relating to the hospital. As a result, important
issues are left unaddressed, and much energy is wasted in anger and resent-
ment. The following two discussions--on the difficulties citizens have
working with each other and on the difficulties citizens have working with
other groups--illustrate the nature of these problems.
a. Problems Citizens Have Working with Each Other
Health is a comparatively difficult issue around which a group can
organize: Citizen participation in Cambridge has worked more successfully
in issues of transportation and education than in issues of health.
Differences in the nature of the issues partially explain the discrepancy.
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Health is a vague, abstract issue. It is difficult for people to
organize around the issue of "good health" or "good education" when the
meaning of each of those terms in unclear. While the meaning of "good
transporation" may also be unclear, the idea of a highway running through
Cambridgeport was painfully clear, and therefore served as a focus for
community action. Health care is not an issue that concerns people unless
they are sick.33 People can think about transportation with some degree
of regularity if a highway is about to go through their neighborhood and
they can think about education with some degree of regularity if they have
children in school, but for many people, health seems to be an important
issue only at times of illness, and a sick person is not bound to be in a
community group. In Cambridge, people have tended to express concern about
health issues only when the neighborhood health program has been in des-
perate straits--when the program was cut from the City Manager's budget in
April, 1973, and in early 1976, when the number of filled positions in the
health stations was dwindling.
Patients are very dependent on medical professionals who encourage
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their passivity and submissiveness. Unlike the areas of transportation
and education, where the professionals--Department of Public Works engineers
and teachers--do not receive an unusually high degree of reverence and
respect, health professionals, particularly doctors, are virtually worshipped.
Few patients doubt a doctor's word, and few are anything but submissive
under a doctor's care.
Consequently, groups whose functions include disagreeing with phy-
sicians have difficulty because they are reluctant to challenge physicians
when their normal relationship with a physician is more passive. In
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Cambridge, an example of this phenomenon is the relationship between the
Health Care Policy Council and the Department of Medicine during the
first year of the HCPC's existence, when its members constantly deferred
to physicians.
Another reason that people may not become excited about health
center issues, is that there are alternative sources of care, however
less attractive they may be. If a highway is to go through Cambridgeport,
everybody is affected, and most people in that neighborhood probably do
not have second homes or alternative places to live. Few people in
Cambridge's low income neighborhoods have any alternative to sending their
children to neighborhood public schools. If a crisis develops, either in
the schools or in a highway plan, people would organize to do something
more quickly because they have no real alternatives. If a health center
closes, people are less likely to react because a closed health center
does not affect them unless they are sick, and, if they are sick, they
could always go to the Outpatient Department, Emergency Room, or nowhere
at all.
However, enough patients perceive neighborhood health station care to
be highly preferable to other alternatives so that there have been large
turnouts at City Council meetings whenever the program is threatened,
despite the problems that citizen participation in health care faces.
Large turnouts would occur with or without the Health Care Policy Council
(the crisis relating to the nurse practitioner vacancy in North Cambridge
is an example).
A final difficulty is that health care is not perceived as a right.
While people generally believe that education is a right and are beginning
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to believe that transportation planners must be attentive to community
needs, health care is still considered by most people to be a commodity that
is purchased. Consequently, people are less prone to demand high quality
health care if they cannot purchase it themselves.
The characteristics of health issues make citizen participation
difficult in the health area, and so do the characteristics of Cambridge
neighborhoods, which consist of different, and sometimes competing ethnic
groups. Because the program is so small, these different groups are ex-
pected to work together. However, in Boston, for example, individual
neighborhoods are big enough so that city-wide cooperation is not absolutely
necessary. The East Boston Neighborhood health center, for example, serves
a population of 60,000 in a very dense area. Cambridge neighborhood health
stations serve much smaller population areas, ranging from 6,000 to 12,000.
people. Consequently, in East Boston, all the'community support is directed
toward one health center, while in Cambridge, support is fragmented over
several neighborhoods. People who live in North Cambridge do not respond
to problems of people in East Cambridge, because of the ethnic differences
and because of the geographic separation.
Cooperation in a continuous way between neighborhoods on a city-wide
basis happens rarely. The Parent Teachers Associations, for example, work
well in individual neighborhoods and individual schools, but there is little
interest in a city-wide PTA Council. Neighborhoods worked together to stop
a major interstate highway designed to cut through the City, but the differ-
ent groups were able to come together only when they all perceived a crisis.
Although neighborhood cooperation is beginning to occur through the Health
Policy Council as it seeks to address health station issues before they
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reach crisis proportions, the majority of people have tended to be con-
cerned only with their own neighborhoods. However, when a crisis occurs,
people from every health station neighborhood came to the City Council
-en masse.
Ethnic differences between neighborhoods and geographic isolation of
neighborhoods make neighborhood coalitions infrequent, but the Health Care
Policy Council and the Neighborhood Family Care Center Board have trouble
working together for additional reasons. The goals of the two groups are
different and most of the time conflicting (service vs. community control).
The NFCC Board does not consider the Health Care Policy Council a legitimate
group, and the Spanish Council considers neither group legitimate.
Each group (Health Care Policy Council, NFCC Board) has internal
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problems which hinder its effectiveness. Crenson found that citizen
groups, some of whose members are affiliated with other groups, tend to
have high levels of. conflict. - High conflict levels in turn are associated
with ill defined agendas and low levels of demands, and a lack of direction
or goals. These characteristics are associated with both the Health Care
Policy Council and the NFCC Board, and add to the difficulties these groups
have relating to the hospital.
b. Problems with Citizen's Groups as They Relate to Other Groups
or Institutions
The major difficulty the NFCC Board and the Health Care Policy Council
have in their attempts to have a meaningful role in the participatory pro-
cess is that they lack legitimacy. Key decisionmakers at the hospital do
not view community groups as legitimate participants in the policy making
process, and therefore exclude them from decisions and do not communicate
with them.
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Such actions on the part of sponsoring institutions are common. In
an analysis of the poverty program, Bachrach and Baratz suggest that
decisionmakers spend time preventing undesirable decisions by preventing
36
any decisions from being made at all (non decisions). An example of this
is the way the hospital does not decide about the relocation of the
M. E. Fitzgerald health station. Bachrach and Baratz suggest that decision-
makers: 1) prevent citizens' groups from issuing demands by coopting them
and by allowing them to participate in decisions without giving them any
real authority or role; 2) deny any demands that may be issued by denying
the legitimacy of the group; 3) construct barriers which block entry into
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the decision making process.
Hospital personnel have used all these forms of exclusion. They have
questioned the legitimacy of the Health Care Policy Council when that group
has demanded to know what steps the hospital was taking to insure the
availability of a nurse practitioner in North Cambridge when it was clear
nobody had taken effective steps in that direction. They have neglected
to inform the Council of meetings which the City Manager declared the
Council could attend, and when a Council member finally went to one meeting,
she was told she could not participate. The NFCC, but not the Health Care
Policy Council, has also used exclusionary tactics when it has refused to
meet with hospital personnel. Although the Cambridge situation may be
somewhat extreme, controversies over the jurisdiction and role of a citizen s
group are common.3 8'3 9
Excluding community groups by denying their legitimacy leads to
several problems. There are important differences between community groups
and hospital personnel and ignoring these differences is not only detrimental
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to service delivery but also brings on conflict. Again, these differences
are not uncommon. March and Simon, in analyzing organizational conflict,
have suggested three sources of conflict: "the existence of a felt need
for joint decision making, a difference in goals and/or a difference in
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perception of reality among the parties." Both Gordon and Hollister
found these qualities to be characteristic of organizational conflict in
neighborhood health center controversies.4 1
This analysis holds in Cambridge. The need for joint decision making
manifests itself in the hospital Medical Excecutive Committee, in the
Neighborhood Health Services Committee, and in the new health ordinance,
which requires that the Health Commissioner make policy decisions in con-
junction with the Board of Health and Hospitals. At the hospital, however,
joint decision making means that decisions are jointly made by the Chiefs,
not by the Chiefs and community groups.
The difference in goals-between the hospital and the NFCC and the
hospital and the Health Policy Council has already been described. Basic-
ally, the NFCC wants community control at any cost, and the hospital per-
sonnel are more interested in service. The Health Care Policy Council
wants a higher level of service at the other health stations than does the
hospital. The difference in perception of reality manifests itself con-
sistently when members of the hospital staff who have key decision making
powers tend not to act on community concerns because they do not believe
the health stations are experiencing any problems.
A major problem with joint decision making at an almost nonexistent
level is that community groups tend to lose out, and do not achieve many
of their goals. Braeger has suggested that the outcome of any bargaining
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process is determined by the resources and power of the bargainers, the
way the issues are framed and raised, and the skills and strategies each
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party uses. When all the power is at the hospital, when the hospital
personnel identify and define issues and when community groups do not have
clearly defined strategies, community groups do not gain much in the
bargaining process. Braeger feels that groups on the outside who want
change, need to identify their goals, formulate demands, and persist, even
with threats, until they are satisfied.4 3
The Health Care Policy Council has adopted such a strategy, much to
the distress of many hospital personnel who do not support community
participation.
Gordon has suggested that the process of community interaction with
a sponsoring institution is one of "disequilibrium, arbitration, and com-
"44promise." In this process, both Hollister and he found Coser's cate-
gories of how groups influence each other useful. These modes of influence
are: "inducement, coercion, rational persuasion, selling, friendship and
"45
authority. In Cambridge, the situation can be identified as one of
"disequilibrium" where, in the case of the NFCC, parties cannot reach a
compromise and in the case of the Health Care Policy Council, some parties
refuse to negotiate. While Hollister found that physicians tended to use
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"rational persuasion" as a form of influence, in Cambridge, hospital
personnel tend to use 'authority" at least as much as "rational persuasion."
47
Citizens in Cambridge have begun to use, as did citizens in Denver,
"coercion" through the political process as a means of influence. How
successful this strategy will be remains to be seen.
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So far substantial improvements in service delivery in one health
station have resulted (the hiring of a nurse practitioner in North
Cambridge), the City Manager has issued a directive to hire a medical
director for the program and an affirmative action policy for hiring minor-
ities, especially bilingual personnel has been signed by the City. Since
these latter two policies have not been implemented, the effect of the
"coercion" strategy is not yet known, but at.the very least, it produced
a policy when earlier there was none.
The attitude of some hospital personnel has been another problem of
citizens' groups. Professional "helping" assistance has, with few excep-
tions, been highly unsatisfactory. The patronizing, condescending tone
many professionals take toward citizens reinforces the conclusion that in
many cases, they meet with community groups because they are told to, not
because they wish to provide an opportunity for citizens to share major
decisions which affect them. Such an attitude takes many forms. William
Ryan calls it "blaming the victim," where any difficulties patients may
have with a program are always in some way the responsibility of the
patient and never of the provider.48 Gordon notes that many problems
which patients have which bring them to neighborhood health centers (drug
addiction, alcoholism, nutrition) have treatments which require extensive
cooperation between patient and physician, and that physicians do not
accept approaches to patient care where they are not in total control.
4 9
Lipsky has also noted that when a provider's job is very demanding and the
expectations of the job very ambiguous, one common solution is for the
provider to take on clients who are easiest to treat because they conform
the most to the values of the provider.5 0
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The lack of hospital leadership also poses a problem for community
groups. Because there is no central direction to the neighborhood health
station program, if a community group does want to engage the hospital in
an issue, the group has no way of knowing who at the hospital is responsible
for that issue and from whom they should expect action.
Further, community groups are isolated from potential allies within
the hospital structure because they have no relationship with the Hospital
Board. At this point, the Board is fairly inactive, but even in its
advisory capacity, it has the potential for acting as a pressure for change.
In the future, it is likely that the Hospital Board will be given, by the
new ordinances, more than an advisory role, and lack of a relationship (in
the form of joint discussions of policy and administrative issues) will be
detrimental to community groups because they will have overlooked a place
where issues will be aired and decisions made.
Since there are no active and effective neighborhood health station
advocates within the hospital structure, community groups are forced to
rely for support on groups which have no direct power. The Health Care
Policy Council tends to rely on the City Council Health and Hospital
Subcommittee to pressure the hospital into dealing with problems of the
health stations. Such reliance has results, but only in a limited way.
The Council Subcommittee usually feels it is going beyond its responsi-
bilities to interfere in problems which are not crises. Like any legis-
lative body, the Council is not supposed to interfere in executive
functions. The Subcommittee has no full-time staff and does not always
have the information to solve problems, although it has developed a much
more constructive program budget review. When the Subcommittee does
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intervene, hospital personnel resent it, and complain to each other and to
the Council that "politics" are entering i-nto the hospital operations.
While Subcommittee intervention can, and has been, very constructive, there
is no assurance that the future chairpeople of the Health and Hospital
Subcommittee will be as interested and responsive as the present one, so
it is unwise to rely so heavily on a group which is removed from the immedi-
ate situationwithout direct power, and whose leadership may not be consis-
tently responsive.
4. Givens
The nature of goals and interests of some citizens who participate
in the health station program suggests that a certain amount of conflict
between citizens and the hospital is inevitable. Inability to resolve the
conflict between the goal of control (expressed by the NFCC Board) and the
goal of service delivery (expressed by the hospital) has resulted in the
closing of the NFCC.
Differing perceptions of reality are also givens, especially when
groups do not communicate regularly with each other. Differing perceptions
of reality were prevalent in Denver, where a certain amount of conflict
occurred because citizens and the sponsoring institutions had very differ-
ent perceptions of reality.5 1
Such differing perceptions of reality occur also in Cambridge in
such extreme forms as the Health Care Policy Council believing that the
hospital is abandoning the health stations by not filling vacant positions
and some hospital personnel not giving the program priority because they
feel it has no problems.
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Even if citizens want no more than an advisory role or to be part
of an informed, joint decision making process, conflict will result when
citizens (the NFCC Board for example) refuse to acknowledge that profes-
sionals have a contribution to make or when professionals want citizen
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participation, as some did in Denver, only on their terms and according
to their needs. In Cambridge this latter approach would mean either no
participation at all, which is the preference of most hospital personnel,
or participation on a very limited and weak advisory basis. While placing
more neighborhood health center advocates in powerful positions within the
Health Department may make citizen participation easier for interested
citizens, the potential power of a coalition of doctors to undermine a
program cannot be ignored, and the Chiefs have already declared their
opposition not only to citizen participation, but also to the hiring of a
neighborhood health station advocate in the form of a full-time director.
Although the conflict will probably never be resolved, the recommenda-
tions that follow in Chapter V seek to establish a process where citizens
play a role in the decision making, and have the opportunity to acquire
the skills necessary in making informed decisions. The recommendations
seek to prevent another situation like the NFCC, where citizen participation
was doomed to fail because the citizens did not have enough knowledge to
run the health center.
A final given is the disinterest of most citizens in city-wide par-
ticipation. While it is possible that the Health Care Policy Council may
become the vehicle for citizen participation in health, the preference of
people to work on a neighborhood level should not be ignored.
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The major difficulties of the neighborhood health station program
have been analyzed and some suggestions for alleviating these difficulties
will be presented. However, care must be taken to insure maintenance of
those aspects of the program which are not riddled with problems or which
are desirable from the point of view of delivering quality neighborhood
health care. Before suggesting recommendations which may address some of
the difficulties in the program, a section will be included which indicates
those qualities of the program recommendations should bolster, rather than.
inadvertently undermine.
A. Qualities of the program which should be preserved in other
program changes
Accessibility. Neighborhood health centers are answers to several problems,
one of which is the decreasing quality of available health care in low
income areas resulting from the decreasing number of physicians practicing
there. Neighborhood health stations in Cambridge provide access to medi-
cal care for low income people in several ways. The health stations are
geographically accessible. Acton has pointed out the importance of time
(both waiting time and travel time) in determining people's use of medical
o 2
services. Waiting time at the health stations is shorter than at the
Emergency Room or outpatient department, and travel time for patients who
use health stations instead of hospital services is considerably reduced.
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Most patients live within a ten minute walk of the health stations, and
many would receive considerably less health care if they had to spend a
great deal of time (two buses, according to Acton) getting somewhere.
-Neighborhood health stations are virtually the only alternative for health
care within a neighborhood, because there are few practicing physicians,
all of whom are old.
The neighborhood health stations are also financially accessible to
patients. The outpatient department provides financial accessibility, not
by scaling down the fees, but by maintaining a loose credit and collection
policy. The difficulty with this method of providing financial accessibility
is that increasing Medicaid cutbacks have resulted in the hospital's tight-
ening its credit and collection policy. Because the health stations provide
care without charge, the care is financially accessible, and any billing
system should preserve that accessibility as much as possible by charging
what people can pay, rather than billing the full fee and expecting people
to pay less. The billing system would be different from the OPD billing
in that the charges would vary with a person's income.
The third kind of accessibility provided by neighborhood health
stations is psychological accessibility. Often, people are reluctant to
go to the hospital for care, because going requires an admission of illness.
For people with psychiatric problems, the neighborhood health stations
provide a point of access into the health care system without stigmatiza-
tion. The head of the outpatient psychiatry department feels that the
neighborhood health stations provide psychological access to care for
people which the hospital cannot duplicate, because going to the hospital
requires a person to recognize and admit that she or he needs help, and
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because hospital staff may not be sensitive to neighborhood or cultural
3
norms.
Type of health care. Comprehensive health care delivered by a team of
professionals is a key concept in the design of many neighborhood health
4
centers. Rubin and Beckhardt have analyzed the organizational factors
which influence the performance of health teams, and Banta analyzed the
health teams at the Columbia Point Health Center and ascribed their
failure to the same kinds of organizational factors Rubin and Beckhardt
stress as important (role conflict, lack of communication, unwillingness
5,6,7
of physicians to delegate responsibility to anyone). Health teams in
the Cambridge neighborhood health station program do not suffer from very
many of these difficulties. Generally, the nurse practitioners and consult-
ing physicians have worked out mutually satisfactory roles and patterns of
communication. With the exception of the Neighborhood Family Care Center,
nurse practitioners, psydhiatric nurses, and social workers do not have
much trouble defining their roles and cooperating with each other. The
team concept breaks down at the hospital but seems to work in the health
stations. Consequently, comprehensive care which extends over a wide
range of problems is an actuality, rather than merely an idea, and "multi-
problem" families can be provided services in a way which does not force
them to go through several bureaucracies, each of which is concerned with
only a piece of their problems. Various observers have praised the
neighborhood health center and the nurse practitioner as a source of
comprehensive primary health and medical care.
Certainly, keeping the nurse practitioners as the main providers of
primary medical care should be an assumption in any set of recommended
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changes in the neighborhood health station program. Evidence suggests
that nurse practitioners provide the same, if not better, quality medical
11,121,13,14,15
care than doctors. The most striking data on this point is
a blind study in Canada where the researchers did not know whether the
patients they were studying were treated by a nurse practitioner or a
doctor and where attention was paid to clinical results rather than clini-
cal records.16 Studies of neighborhood health center care indicate that
the care is of the same if not higher quality than other sources of care.
1 7
'
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While no quality of care study has been done in Cambridge, the doctors who
are familiar with the program feel that the nurse practitioners provide
at least as good medical care both in terms of process and outcome as any
general practitioner .19
Not only do nurse practitioners provide quality medical care, they
also provide quality health care. Gordon points out that many problems
providers encounter in neighborhood health centers require motivating and
educating patients to cooperate in a treatment program and to take care of
themselves, and that physicians are not always interested in this approach,
which is considerably different from giving a patient a prescription.
2 0
Merenstein and Skrovan have shown that nurse practitioners are especially
skilled in patient education, and are sensitive to health, as well as
medical concerns. 21,22 Nurse practitioners would tend to have these skills
because patient education and health concerns are important aspects of
nurses? schooling. These added skills are desirable in a neighborhood
health station program, where many of the users have concerns. which are
not limited to medical problems.
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A broader approach not only allows a greater sensitivity to health
problems, but allows patients a greater role in their treatment programs.
The outpatient department of psychiatry at the hospital feels very strongly
that a prerequisite for mental health is the ability to exercise control
over one's life, and that one route to such control is the development of
a cooperative relationship with a provider consisting not only of patients
taking orders but also of their learning how to take care of themselves
and providers learning to meet needs patients perceive as well as needs
.23providers perceive.
The neighborhood health station program was designed to replace the
disappearing neighborhood family physician--the person who not only took
care of acute medical problems, but provided followup for hospital care,
provided psychiatric services in a nonstigmatized environment, and was
able to do so in a context where she or he was'in touch with neighborhood
needs and norms. The nurse practitioner provides precisely these services.
Public ownership and administration of service. Public ownership of a
service means that ultimate accountability rests with a public body, even
indirectly. Public ownership of the hospital has insured responsiveness
to community needs, and would provide protection of those needs in the
future. Privately run provider organizations are not accountable to the
public interest.
Any recommendations, then, should preserve the accessibility--
geographic, psychological, and financial-of the health station program,
and should provide for the delivery of comprehensive, coordinated health
services by nurse practitioners in a program owned and run by the City.
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B. Recommendations regarding the role of the City in setting policy
for and administering a neighborhood health station program
In order for the neighborhood health station program to be more
effective and more efficient, the Department of Health and Hospitals must
make a commitment to the program. This commitment should take the form of
hiring a person responsible for the program and giving her or him adequate
power and authority to insure a well run program. Hiring a neighborhood
health station director is the most crucial step for the City to take in
order to address the program's difficulties. The following discussion
describes the position a director should hold within the organizational
structure of the Department of Health and Hospitals, what her or his
responsibilities would be, and how she or he should work with other health
related groups or institutions. Although hiring a neighborhood health
station director should be a first priority of the City, a section describ-
ing recommended roles for other City health actors who relate to the
neighborhood health station program is also included since the opportunity
for changing these roles exists and since some changes improve the program's
operation and would make the director's job easier.
1. Establishing a new department for neighborhood health
services, hiring a department head who will be program
director and whose duties will be specified.
Recommendation: The low priority and lack of attention given to this
program by hospital personnel, the size and complexity of the
program, (which makes it difficult for hospital personnel to run it
as well as run the hospital) and the large number of people making
decisions concerning the program indicate the need for a new
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department and for a medical director of the department.
The department should be within the hospital organization, but
not under the jursidiction of the in-patient service.
Reasons to keep the health station program within the hospital
are: the program is too small to justify separation from the hospital.
Although the Chief of Medicine cannot run his department and the
neighborhood health stations at the same, time, the Chief of Pediatrics
and the Chief of Ob-Gyn, whose departments are smaller, have no trouble
running their departments and their portions of the neighborhood
health station program. Even though coordination of services is poor
now, separating the program from the hospital might result in less
coordinated services because no one would be at the hospital to see
that such coordination (i.e. between the health stations and the
Emergency Room or in-patient service) took place. The City infirmary,
City nursing home and the hospital are separate departments that do
not coordinate services well.
Reasons not to keep the program under the jurisdiction the
Department of Medicine are: the priorities of the leadership will
probably remain with the in-patient service; the Chief of Medicine
has no authority over other deparments and thus cannot guarantee
coordinated services. (This is not to minimize the difficulty of
coordinating services from any organizational base.) Because the
adult health station program has so many difficulties right now, its
department should be limited in jurisdiction to the neighborhood
health station program. (This jurisdiction would include the pedi-
atric program too, since there will be decisions which will involve
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coordination between adult and pediatric medicine--adolescent clinics
and relocation of health stations, for example.)
In the future, when the program is running more smoothly, the
department could be expanded into an ambulatory services department,
and would include neighborhood health stations, the outpatient and
emergency services. Creating a neighborhood health services depart-
ment within the hospital does not preclude the possibility of such
integration in the future. By giving the department head jurisdiction
over services delivered in the health stations, somebody will have the
authority to coordinate services delivered there. No director will
be able to run the program smoothly unless there is cooperation from
the Chiefs, but the creation of a new department will provide a full-
time neighborhood health station advocate in the hospital who will
have control over care delivered in the health stations and a stronger
say in the decisions and compromises made which relate to the inter-
face between the health stations and other hospital departments.
Creating a department specifically for neighborhood health
services legitimizes the concept of comprehensive, coordinated
neighborhood health care. The department, in the hospital, but with
its own jurisdiction, will be able to maintain all the characteristics
of the program outlined in section A--care delivered in a neighborhood
setting, a wide range of health and medical services coordinated in
one location. At the same time, establishing a department will result
in the authority and commitment necessary to address the problems
relating to the health stations themselves and to the coordination
with other departments.
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Implementation: The department could be created by an order of the City
Manager, or a Health Commissioner if the position were filled.
Recommendation: The director of the neighborhood health station program
should be a physician whose position would be Chief of Neighborhood
Health Services (equal to the Chief of Medicine, Chief of Pediatrics,
etc.). Since the previous program director was unable to exercise
any authority over the physicians, and did not meet the Medicaid
requirements for a medical director becuase he was not an M.D., the
director should be, for the time being, a physician. Hiring a phy-
sician will allow the program to qualify for Medicaid payments with-
out dismissing the nurse practitioners, whose services do not qualify
for Medicaid reimbursement unless a physician is present.
Implementation: The City Manager or Health Commis-sioner could determine
the qualifications necessary for the job of medical director and could
determine the place of the position within the hospital organizational
structure (i.e. the director would be the Chief of Neighborhood Health
Services).
The establishment of a new department with a specific jurisdiction
over neighborhood health services and the establishment of a new
position--Chief of Neighborhood Health--should provide the vehicles
necessary to address the problems of fragmented leadership, diffused
authority, lack of accountability, and poor coordination among ser-
vices. Naming one individual to be responsible for running the health
station program clears up questions of leadership, authority,
accountability and coordination within the health stations.. The
medical director should control the budget of the program, a budget
I
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separate and distinct from the hospital budget. Such separation
should cut down the resentment on the part of some hospital personnel
who feel the clinics are draining hospital funds. While health
station and hospital personnel would continue to receive supplies
from the same place, careful accounting would be crucial.
The medical director should control the health station staff.
Staff should be accountable to the health station director and not to
the respective heads of service at the hospital, although for the
purpose of better coordination and mutual respect, hiring of nurse
practitioners should be done jointly by the medical director and
other relevant department heads. For example, the medical director
should hire psychiatric nurse practitioners with the approval of the
nursing and psychiatry departments. Agreement over personnel should
facilitate coordination.
The medical director should have the power to negotiate with,
rather than take orders from, the medical executive committee of the
hospital, especially pertaining to such issues as medical backup and
referral procedures. Coordinated interface between the health sta-
tions and other hospital departments will be a result of cooperation,
not an exercise of authority, and a director should recognize the
need for such cooperation.
Recommendation: The duties of the health station director should be
clearly specified in these areas:
Administration. The health station director should be in charge of
coordinating health station services. Coordination should consist of:
---supervising the staff in each health station, helping them
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develop more efficient ways to deliver team health care. The
director should meet with and supervise all health station
staff, whether their salaries were from the City or the HEW
family planning grant.
---providing for a central record keeping system, perhaps even a
family record keeping system to assure coordinated care.
---preparing plans for the expansion of the program for approval
by the Commissioner.
Increasing the financial stability of the program. The health station
director could address financial instability in the following ways:
---provide the forum for discussion and decision on the nature
of a billing system compatible with the needs of the community,
and then provide for the institution of that system. The
billing system should not provide financial accessibility
only by maintaining a loose credit and collection policy (like
the OPD), but also should incorporate a sliding fee schedule
into its charges.
---determine the availability of alternative sources of funding,
especially the availability of federal categorical grants.
--- structure the program to comply with Department of Public
Safety and Department of Public Health licensing standards in
order to apply for reimbursements.
---apply for all necessary certificates-of-need twarded by the
Department of Public Health in order tQ qualify for reimburse-
ment.
--- structure the program so that it complies with Medicaid
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reimbursement standards. These include: adequate on-site
physician coverage; a comprehensive, coordinated program of
health care with adequate medical backup at the hospital; a
definite organizational structure defining the administration
leadership and the relationship with the hospital; and a
definition of the role of citizen participation. Such a
structure should not mean that nurse practitioners are replaced
with physicians in group practice, simply because at the moment
Medicaid will not pay for nurse practitioners. Nurse practi-
tioners can be less expensive than physicians, can be as
capable as physicians in delivering primary medical services,
and can be more capable than physicians in delivering health
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services. At the same time, however, distinct efforts must
be made to qualify the Cambridge neighborhood health stations
for reimbursement. Comprehensive national health insurance
is not in the immediate offing, so some structural change in
the program is necessary. However, other neighborhood health
stations staffed by nurse practitioners receive third party
reimbursements, so that altering the program to meet reimburse-
ment requirements until there is national health insurance
does not mean sacrificing the nurse practitioner program.
---improve economic efficiency. Improving economic efficiency
would include a consideration of the appropriate allocation
of services between the hospital and the health stations, the
development of sufficient examining room space to allow better
use of the health stations by nurse practitioners, physicians
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and social workers, and streamlined administrative procedures
to allow the nurse practitioners more time to treat patients.
Responsiveness to community needs. The health station director must
meet with the community groups and patients to find out what their
needs are, and then must provide the structure in the program to meet
those needs. Some of these needs are:
--- determining whether the service mix at each health station
responds to local needs.
---determining how health station hours can be rearranged to
allow working people to use the health stations, i.e. evening
hours.
---determining how, in some health stations, more low income,
needy people can become patients, i.e. perhaps allowing new
patients to come in on an emergency walk-in basis, and perhaps
developing ways of advertising the clinics.
--- developing a hiring policy which includes community input.
In order to ascertain what the community health needs are, the
medical director should develop surveys, meet with health oriented
community groups, such as the Health Care Policy Council, and also
meet with other community groups who are concerned with health
related issues, such as the Spanish council and tenants' organizations.
She or he should also meet with community health. oriented groups who
are not affiliated with the Cambridge Hospital, such as the Cambridge-
port Problem Center or the Women's Community Health Center. The health
station director should determine with community groups what their
relationship will be (joint policy naking, for example), what the scope
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of the relationship will be, and what the formal communication
mechanism will be. (See citizen participation recommendations.)
Relating to other groups or institutions.
---Federal government. The health station director should apply
for federal grants, working with the Commissioner and with her
or his approval. Such approval is necessary to preclude com-
petition with other agencies in the City and to allow the City
to speak as a whole. The health station director should
prepare, working with the Commissioner and with his or her
approval, testimony on behalf of bills in Congress which have
consequences for the health station program. Nobody is doing
that now, and several bills that would have benefited the pro-
gram have been introduced and failed.
---State concerns. The health station director should prepare
and submit to the Commissioner for his or her approval any
applications to the State for certificate-of-need or for
Medicaid reimbursement so there is no competition with other
agencies or other physicians. The Commissioner should then
represent the City in negotiations with the state, or delegate
that responsibility to the director. The health station
director should prepare and submit to the Commissioner for
his or her approval any testimony regarding any bills relating
to the health stations in the Massachusetts legislature so
there would be no conflict or competition. The Commissioner
should then represent the City, or delegate that responsibility
to the health station director. The health station director
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should join the Massachusetts League of Neighborhood Health
Centers, an organization which can provide her or him with a
great deal of information and technical assistance.
---Regional concerns. The health station director should provide
information to the Commissioner regarding the relationship of
the program to the regional Health Systems Agency regarding
neighborhood health centers. With approval of the Commissioner,
the neighborhood health station director can apply for devel-
opment grants from this agency.
---City concerns.
City hospital. The health station director should negotiate
with the medical executive committee or individual depart-
ment heads to reach agreements on a backup and referral
pattern, an appropriate division of services between the
hospital and the neighborhood health centers, a billing
system, and an education and information program which
would create an awareness within the hospital of the
health station program and make known the responsibilities
of hospital personnel to the health stations (such as
doing lab tests and sending discharge summaries back to
the health stations).
City Manager. The health station director need not relate to
the City Manager unless there is not a Commissioner
because the Commissioner will be the Manager's right hand
person in charge of health.
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Planning Department, Community Development office. The health
station director need not relate to these groups because
any people in these departments who work on health issues
should be moved into the Commissioner's office as her or
his staff, where they would provide assistance to the
health station director.
The Health and Hospital Board of Trustees (Health Policy Board).
The health station director should be responsible for
providing any information about her or his program
requested by the Board, since the Board may recommend
program policy to the Commissioner. There should be a
subcommittee of the Board concerned with community medi-
cine, and the health station director should attend
those subcommittee meetings. I
City Council. The health station director should meet with
the City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee, pre-
ferably at Health Policy Board meetings, so that the
City Council Subcommittee is aware of what neighborhood
health center budget requests mean, and so that the City
Council Subcommittee can be responsive if communications
break down between the health station director and the
Commissioner, the health station director and the Board,
or the Commissioner and the Board.
Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee. The health station
director should provide information requested by the
staff of the citizen's group, who is an employee of CEOC.
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The health station director, working with the Commissioner
should assist CEOC in making federal health grant appli-
cations.
Commissioner of Health. The health station director should
be accountable directly to the Commissioner of Health,
who would settle policy conflicts among the various
department heads. A strong Commissioner could support
the program but would not have the time to run it him-
self or herself because the responsibilities of the
Commissioner are very broad. They include supervising
all the health departments, paying attention to environ-
mental health issues, and coordinating public and private
services.
Implementation: Either the City Manager or the Health Commissioner could
state that the neighborhood health station director's job would
include the responsibilities just described. Because the medical
executive committee is also accountable to the Commissioner, she or
he would be able to guarantee that coordination among departments
occurs and that neighborhood health station policy is implemented.
To help insure a smooth running program, the director should make a
concerted effort to obtain cooperation from other department heads,
rather than rely completely on the Commissioner or City Manager.
2. Changing the role of other City health actors.
While the most crucial recommendation for the neighborhood health
station program is that of establishing a neighborhood health station
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department with a medical director, changes in the roles of other City
health actors could provide additional support and authority for the
director. Since the City health ordinances are being rewritten, and the
priorities and policies of the Health and Hospital department reordered,
the opportunity for other kinds of changes exists. The following
recommendations are all politically feasible.
Recommendation: The Commissioner. The previous Commissioner spent most
of his time overseeing the day to day management of the hospital. He
spent little time encouraging health service coordination, either
within the hospital, among the departments, or between the hospital
and other health providers, both City and private. A Commissioner
must be able to resolve disagreements between the health station
director and other hospital or health department services. Since
there is no Commissioner, the only person'who can demand compliance
from the hospital regarding neighborhopd health services is the City
Manager, who does not have the time to be involved in the health area
at this level. The Commissioner should play the following role:
--- establish policy for coordinating hospital activities with
health station activities. Recommendations from the Board,
from the hospital, from the health station director, and
from the community may form the basis of such policy, but the
final authority rests with the Commissioner. Furthermore, in
her or his capacity to make policy decisions concerning
environmental health and housing, the Commissioner could use
the neighborhood health station program as a way to identify
important health related housing problems.
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---approve any certificate-of-need applications submitted by the
health station director, any federal grant applications, any
testimony concerning legislation, or concerning activities of
regional planning agencies, and any proposed negotiations with
any state or federal agencies. The Commissioner must have this
responsibility so that competition or conflict within the City
is resolved before any applications or testimony is public.
As coordinator of health resources, the Commissioner has the
responsibility of resolving such conflicts, so that the City
can present itself in a unified and solidified way before state
and federal agencies. State and regional administrators would
then know with whom they should negotiate.
---approve any expansion plans submitted by the health station
director to avoid duplication of services. Furthermore, if
at any point the Commissioner decides that the neighborhood
health station program is running well and that all outpatient
services (neighborhood health, ER, OPD) should be combined,
she or he will have the power to do so.
Implementation: The existing City health ordinances implicitly give the
Health Commissioner these powers and responsibilities just described.
The new health ordinances, not yet passed by the City Council, state
most of these responsibilities explicitly. To guarantee that the
Health Commissioner addresses city-wide health issues and does not
become involved in the day to day operations of the hospital, her or
his office will be moved from the hospital to City Hall.
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Recommendation: Community Development office, Planning Department. People
in these offices who work with health issues should become part of
the Commissioner's staff, so that the Commissioner can have needed
staff, and so that the work now being done in these offices will not
take place in a vacuum.
Implementation: The new health ordinance should provide staff for the
Commissioner and the City Manager could arrange for the transfer of
staff. Staff for the neighborhood health station director could be
provided by a directive from either the City Manager or the Health
Commissioner.
Recommendation: Health Policy Board. If the Commissioner does not choose
to address herself or himself to issues involving neighborhood health
stations and to set policy, and the Board feels these issues are
important, the Board should have the power- to insure that the Commis-
sioner responds to these issues. The Board should have more than an
advisory capacity, some of its members should be concerned with commu-
nity health, and it should have access to information about programs.
Implementation: The new health ordinance should provide for all these
concerns, by directing the Board to pay attention to community medi-
cine, providing it with staff, requesting the City Manager to insure
consumer representation, and by stating that the Commissioner is
expected to reach policy agreement with the Board. This Board, whose
members can devote more time to health issues than the City Council,
should replace the City Council Health Subcommittee as the forum for
public discussion of health issues. Because the City Council is
ultimately accountable for the budget of the program, the Chairperson
of the Subcommittee should sit on the Board.
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Recommendation: City Council. With an active Commissioner (who has
specific responsibilities toward the health station program and who
is accountable both to a board and to a group of citizens), with an
active Board, with an active group of citizens, and with a neighbor-
hood health station director, there should be no need for the City
Council to take an active role in any area other than budget review.
However, if there should be no powerful neighborhood health advocates,
the City Council is a last resort mechanism which can demand a response
from the Health Department by pressuring the City Manager. Since City
councillors are ultimately accountable and responsible to their con-
stituencies, since using the City Council as a last resort mechanism
to make the system respond to health station needs has been a common
way of doing business and since the City Council must approve the
budget, the City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee should not
disappear once the new organization is in place. The chairperson of
the Health and Hospital Subcommittee should sit on the Health Policy
Board as an ex officio member, and should continue to meet with the
citizens groups and the Commissioner to keep informed about issues
and developments. As all these groups begin to communicate with each
other and to relate to each other, it may no longer be necessary for
the chairperson to act as mediator. The chairperson should not be
the only mediator because the interest of City councillors in health
issues and their ability to address those issues (without staff) is
not consistent.
Implementation: The new City ordinance should state that the chairperson
of the City Council Health and Hospital Subcommittee should be an
ex officio Board member. In the event that the ordinance does not
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state this explicitly, the City Manager can, in making his appointments,
suggest that the Council Subcommittee chairperson sit on the Board as
an ex officio member. The Board itself could ask the Subcommittee to
attend and participate in meetings.
Recommendation: Health Station Administrator. The job of health station
administrator has been phased out, because the health station admini-
trator could not control the program. The administrator position could
become a business manager or administrative assistant position, and
the person hired could assist the director in establishing the billing
system and record keeping system, and in keeping track of supplies,
purchasing, and physical maintenance of the health stations.
Implementation: Either the City Manager or Commissioner could decide to
use the health station administrator this way.
Recommendation: Nurse Practitioner Supervisor. For over a year, this
position was vacant. The new supervisor is accountable to the dir-
ector of nursing at the hospital. Such a person should be accountable
to the neighborhood health station director, and should have the
following responsibilities:
---helping the nurse practitioners and health station director
establish and implement a public education and information
program,
---help develop programs for training the paraprofessional staff
to expand their roles,
---coordinate programs which provide for the continuing education
of the nurse practitioners,
---represent the nurse practitioners at meetings with the health
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station director concerning health station programs,
---represent the nurse practitioners at community meetings,
---represent the nurse practitioners at meetings of the pro-
fessional group and lobby group for nurse practitioners.
Implementation: The City Manager or Health Commissioner could make the
decision to place the nurse practitioner supervisor in the neighbor-
hood health station department. To insure better coordination among
the nursing services, the director of nursing and the neighborhood
health station director could make joint hiring decisions.
Recommendation: Neighborhood Health Center Committee. This committee at
the hospital now has control of the health station program. Control
of the program should go to the health station director. The group
should remain a standing committee of the medical executive committee
and should be responsible for working out- agreements with the health
station director concerning the relationship between the health
stations and the hospital, but the health station director should be
responsible for health services provided in the health stations.
Implementation: A decision by the Commissioner or the City Manager is
necessary to bring about this change.
C. Recommendations regarding the role of citizen participation in
the neighborhood health station program
The most important recommendation for improving the role of citizen
participation in the neighborhood health station program is that of
establishing a process for citizen participation which provides a mech-
anism for citizens and professionals to deal with health issues on a con-
tinual basis, and provides citizens with access to the necessary skills
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and expertise so citizen participation will not continue to fail. However,
few of the specific suggestions will be possible to implement in the
absence of a firm commitment to citizen involvement on the part of the
City, a recognition of its merits, and a clear understanding of how mis-
handling of citizen participation .has hampered the program in the past.
The recommendations recognize that most consumer health groups do
not want total policy or financial control of the health stations. The
recommendations take into consideration that citizen participation, through
the Health Care Policy Council and the City Council, has been the primary
means by which the City Manager has become concerned enough with the issue
to hold the hospital accountable. The recommendations identify a process
where citizens can become involved before decisions are made and before
problems reach a crisis. At the same time, the recommendations recognize
that the NFCC Board does not represent its neighborhood and does not have
the capability to maintain control over the health center. Detailed
specification of the role of citizens' groups is not included because
specific functions and roles will inevitably grow out of dialogue and
negotiation among the parties involved. These recommendations discuss the
possible roles for citizen participation and the necessary mechanisms
which will establish a process of meaningful dialogue and participation.
Basically, the recommendations include providing citizens' groups with
staff support, defining substantial concrete jobs for them to do, creating
a mutually agreed upon and continuous process for relating to the hospital
(specifically the medical director) and increasing the membership in the
citizens' groups. While many of the problems with citizen participation
have been related to the nature of the citizens' groups, a crucial
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problem has been the lack of an authority at the hospital to whom citizens
could relate and the lack of an established decision making process in
which citizens could participate. The implementation of recommendations
regarding the role of the City in administering the program--specifically
the establishment of a department for neighborhood health and the hiring
of a medical director whose responsibilities include addressing community
needs--should alleviate those problems of citizen participation which are
related to the hospital's role in administering the program.
Recommendation: Provide the necessary skill and expertise for both
groups to become effective boards.
Implementation: The NFCC Board should have a coordinator to be its staff.
The position can be established by the City Manager and the person
could be hired by both the new NFCC Board and the City, although
she or he will be responsible to the NFCC-Board.
Both the NFCC and the Health Care Policy Council staff need to
learn how other effective neighborhood health center boards work and
how effective boardsmanship skills can be developed. People in Boston
knowledgeable in these areas have offered their time and assistance.
Another means of providing access to this kind of expertise is by
having professionals sitting on both boards.
Recommendation: The NFCC and the Health Care Policy Council need to develop
a process for relating to the hospital and to other City officials.
In the present structure, there is no mutually agreed upon process.
Under a new structure, the public official who would deal most dir-
ectly with the health stations would be the health station director.
The process for relating to this person would include:
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1. Holding meetings with the director on a regular basis. The
director could go to community meetings to discuss proposals
and/or include community representatives in her or his staff
meetings.
2. Defining the role of citizen participation, both in terms of
scope, i.e. defining the issues in which community groups
would participate, and in terms of level of participation,
i.e. determining whether community groups would maintain an
advisory role, or whether they would enter into a partnership
with the City. Any definitions of the role for community
groups would have to be teached' through a discussion between
the City and the groups. The problem now is that no process
exists because hospital personnel do not support citizen
participation. Once a neighborhood health station director
is hired, (one who supports citizen participation) arriving
at a mutual understanding and agreement between the director
and the HCPC will not be difficult.
Implementation: Based on present City and consumer group attitudes,
implementation of this recommendation could take several forms. The
Health Care Policy Council is interested in continuing for an undeter-
mined amount of time in an advisory capacity, provided that the Council
has the opportunity to meet regularly with hospital personnel, have
access to information, and be included when policy or budget decisions
are made. Since the City Manager agrees that the group should have
at least this much authority, the Council should write a memorandum
of understanding, including these provisions, to be signed both by
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the Council and the City. To insure implementation, the Council and
the City must take care to hire a neighborhood health station director
who wants to work with community groups. Any further agreements,
such as the development of joint policymaking and budgetary powers,
can be made when the Council feels it has the expertise and interest
in such an agreement. At the moment the Council does not have the
expertise to assume full or partnership responsibilities and does not
want to undertake a project that will fail. However, by making informed
proposals and contributions to the decisionmaking process, the Council
will increase both its credibility and its authority.
The NFCC, however, is a different situation. The Public Health
Council is demanding that a process of significant citizen partici-
pation in the running of the NFCC be established now. The difference
between the NFCC and the Health Care Policy Council is that the NFCC
wants control. The City does not feel the NFCC Board has the necessary
skills to run the health center. A compromise which may be amenable
to both groups is the development of a written agreement which gives
a new NFCC Board advisory status to begin with, and over a specific
period of time increases the power of the Board until the Board and
the City are in a policy making partnership, similar to the City of
Boston/neighborhood health center partnerships. A necessary element
of such an agreement is the provision of staff and information by
the City so that the NFCC Board will develop the necessary expertise.
The Jefferson Park group (the North Cambridge Health and Social
Services Committee) would like to exercise complete policy control
over their health center by leasing the health center to the hospital
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with conditions set by the Committee. Should the hospital not imple-
ment policy, the Committee is free to break the contract. Since
both the City and the Committee are about to sign the agreement, no
substantial changes can be made.
While from the City's point of view, signing one agreement with
one city-wide group, probably the Health Care Policy Council, would
be preferable to signing three agreements with three groups, the'
Health Care Policy Council has considerably less power than the other
two groups, so the possibility of all the groups coming together is
nonexistent at the moment. These recommendations do not preclude
that possibility in the future, when all the groups may be on more
equal footing.
Recommendation: Regardless of the agreed upon status of consumer health
groups, these groups should:
a. reach agreement with the City on the following issues:
level of health station staffing, health station hours,
service mix, hiring, billing and expansion policy. These
agreements could take a variety of forms. One possible
hiring policy could be that the neighborhood health center
director chooses ten candidates and the Health Care Policy
Council narrows it down to three. In terms of expansion,
residents from-one neighborhood could submit a proposal
stating their perception of their needs, and the health
station locations which would best meet those needs. The
health station director would then incorporate the proposal
into her or his plan and submit that to the group for
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discussion. In both cases, ultimate authority rests with
the health station director, a sitution which Health Care
Policy Council members would be happy with as long as the
director was responsive, and the members feel that hiring a
director who is a neighborhood health station advocate and
who could devote full time to running the program, guarantees
adequate responsiveness. If an advisory role ptoves inade-
quate, the Council could work out a partnership agreement,
similar to the Boston neighborhood health centers. If this
route is taken, the group should make sure it-has adequate
and competent staff to carry out is responsibilities.
b. establish regular meeting times with the medical director
and appoint someone to make up the agenda and keep the
minutes so all parties are accountable for their statements
and decisions.
c. establish a relationship with the Health Policy Board
(Department of Health and Hospitals Board of Trustees). In
the event that the new City health ordinances are passed,
the Board will be required to address issues of community
health. Community groups could relate to whatever mechanism
is established, probably a subcommittee. Relationship with
this Board is necessary because the Board and the Commissioner
will be responsible for making health policy and community
groups would want to participate in policy decisions which
would affect them.
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d. continue the relationship with the Health and Hospital
Subcommittee of the City Council. The City Council ulti-
mately controls the budget, so it should be kept aware of
citizens' needs. Furthermore, at the moment, it is a strong
ally of citizens.
Implementation: The City and the consumer groups must hire a medical
director in order to implement recommendations a and b. The new
ordinance must be adopted for the implementation of recommendation c.
Recommendation d is in effect. Consumer groups need only call the
City Council Subcommittee chairperson and include her in their meetings
to continue a meaningful relationship with the Subcommittee.
Recommendation: Strengthen the membership in existing groups. The Health
Care Policy Council has only three official members, according to its
by-laws, although attendance at meetings has been much higher. Both
the constituency and the legitimacy of the group would be increased
if people who consistently attend meetings and participate would be
allowed to join. The Neighborhood Family Care Center Board is large,
but the number who attend meetings regularly is very small, and there
have been no new Board members who attend meetings in several years.
The NFCC Board needs to be more representative of the patient popu-
lation at the health center.
Implementation: Elections for seats on both the NFCC Board and the Health
Care Policy Council have had very low turnouts, so elections are not
necessarily the way to increase the number of active members on
either board. A change in the Health Care Policy Council by-laws is
required to allow people who regularly attend meetings to vote. If
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the Health Care Policy Council planned and held meetings in the
individual health station neighborhoods (rather than at CEOC), and
called registered patients beforehand to inform them of meetings,
attendance would be much higher. Low attendance will probably cease
to be an important issue when a meaningful process of relating to
the hospital is established, when a specific authority at the hospital
is established to whom citizens can relate, a decision making process
is defined in which citizens can participate, and when specific roles
for citizens are defined. When these changes occur, people will have
reason to remain in the group, and fewer people will leave because they
are frustrated.
Implementation of this recommendation is slightly different for
the NFCC. By order of the Public Health Council, which is voting on
the City's certificate-of-need application for the new NFCC, the City
and the present NFCC Board must come to an agreement on the composition
and powers of the Board. Because the existing Board is not representa-
tive of the patients, and because existing Board members have held
their positions since the health center opened in 1968, and because
some existing Board members do not have the interest in attending
meetings, some changes need to be made. Ideally, there should be a
new interim board, one-third of which consists of NFCC Board members,
and two-thirds of which consists of people selected by the City
Manager from slates presented to him by neighborhood groups and
professionals. At least two-thirds of the new group should be
neighborhood residents and the composition of the group should reflect
the patient population. At least a few members should be sympathetic
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professionals who can provide expertise. The by-laws of the group
should provide for the automatic resignation of those members who
do not attend meetings regularly.
Recommendation: The NFCC and the Health Care Policy Council, as well as
other health oriented groups in the City, such as the Women's Community
Health Center, should begin to meet together occasionally. While it
is important for individual neighborhoods to have individual meetings
in their own neighborhoods, competing groups should meet together
because a group representing the whole City can achieve much more than
individual splinter groups without a constituency, and because many
issues exist which are common to the different groups.
Implementation: The NFCC and the Health Care Policy Council staff could
work with the groups to focus on common concerns. The staff could
deal with the general difficulties of orgahizing around health issues
by addressing these concrete, specific problems which health station
patients are often more sensitive to than the present health station
administrators: the need for enough nurse practitioners so that no
health station is shortchanged by either having no nurse of its own
or by having to accommodate another health station's patients, the
need for bilingual staff, the need for a good referral system between
the hospital and the health stations, the need for a billing system
which meets the needs of the patients, the need for health station
hours and service mix which meet the needs of the patients. The
groups would then have specific proposals to make to the hospital.
The tendency for groups to demand unnecessary or luxury programs is
precluded by the fact that most consumers are taxpayers and understand
how very expensive programs can raise the tax rate.
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The establishment of a new department for neighborhood health
services with a full-time medical director should provide the necessary
structure within which the City can administer the neighborhood health
station program. By providing the medical director with a department
of her or his own, rather than keeping the program under the Chief of
Medicine, the medical director would have the authority necessary to
control and coordinate services within the health stations. By making
the medical director a Chief of a department, (rather than within a
department) she or he will be in a stronger bargaining position with
other departments and therefore will be in a stronger position to
bring about better interface between the health stations and the hos-
pital. By making the medical director a full-time position, the
neighborhood health stations will receive first, rather than second
or third priority. A process for running' the program on a continuous
day-to-day basis, rather- than on a crisis-by-crisis basis can be
established within this kind of organizational structure and specific
delineation of authority. Citizens would then know who was responsible
for the program and with whom they must interact. The creation of a
formal decision making process at the hospital creates the opportunity
for citizens to participate. A mutual understanding between the hos-
pital and citizens' groups of how citizens would participate should
decrease considerably the tension between the two groups and allow
each party to benefit from the perspective of the other. The develop-
ment of an agreed upon process for citizen participation, the delin-
eation of specific tasks for citizens to do, and adequate staffing
of citizens' groups should increase their ability to make substantial
contributions to the running of the program.
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pp. 847-53.
11. Flynn, B., "The Effectiveness of Nurse Clinician's Service Delivery,"
American Journal of Public Health, vol. 64, no. 6, June 1974, p. 604.
12. Henriques, Virgadamo, and Kahane, "Performance of Adult Health Appraisal
Examinations Utilizing Nurse Practitioner-Physician Teams and Paramedical
Personnel," American Journal of Public Health, vol. 64, no. 1,
'January 1974, pp. 47-54.
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13. Merenstein, Wolfe and Barker, "The Use of the Nurse Practitioner in
General Practice," Medical Care, vol. 12, no. 5, May 1974, p. 445.
14. Tagliacozzo, Luskin, Lashoff and Liama, "Nurse Practitioner Intervention
and Patient Behavior," American Journal of Public Health, vol. 64, no. 6,
June 1974, pp. 596-603.
15. Taller and Feldman, "The Training and Utilization of Nurse Practitioners
in Adult Health Appraisal," Medical Care, vol. 12, -no. 1, January 1974,
pp. 40-49.
16. Spitzer, Sackett, Sibley, Roberts, Gent, Kergin, Hackett and Olynich,
"The Burlington Randomized Trial of the Nurse Practitioner," New England
Journal of Medicine, vol. 29, no. 5, January 1974, p. 251.
17. Morehead, Donaldson, and Seravelli, "Comparisons Between OEO Neighborhood
Health Centers and Other Health Care Providers on Ratings of Quality of
Care," American Journal of Public Health, vol. 61, no. 7, July 1971,
p. 1294.
18. Sparer and Johnson, "Evaluation of Neighborhood Health Centers," American
Journal of Public Health, vol. 61, no. 5, May 1971, p. 931.
19. Comments by Cambridge Hospital physicians at City Council Health and
Hospital Subcommittee meeting, Spring 1975.
20. Gordon, J., "The Politics of Community Medicine Projects: A Conflict
Analysis," in Hollister, Kramer and Bellin, op. cit., p. 114.
21. Merenstein, p., cit., p. 445.
22. Skrovan, op. cit., p. 847.
23. Macht, op. cit., p. 53.
24. That is, nurse practitioners tend to pay attention to social and
psychiatric problems of patients, and tend to teach patients how to
take care of themselves.
161.
Bibliography
Acton, J. "Demand for Health Care Among the Urban Poor, With Special Em-
phasis on the Role of Time" Rand - 1151 OEO/NYC April, 1973.
Acton, J. "Non Monetary Factors in the Demand for Medical Services, Some
Empirical Evidence" Rand P5021, 1973.
Aday, L. "Noneconomic Barriers to the Use of Needed Medical Services"
Medical Care, vol. 13, no. 6. June, 1975.
Alinsky, S. "The War on Poverty - Political Pornography" Journal of Social
Issues, vol. 11, no. 6. January, 1965.
Altshuler, A. Community Control. New York: Pegasus, 1970.
Arnold, Blakenship, Hess (eds.) Administering Health Systems. Chicago:
Atherton, 1971.
Bachrach and Baratz. Power and Poverty. New York: Oxford University Press,
1970.
Bachrach and Baratz. "Two Faces of Power" American Political Science
Review, December, 1962.
Banta and Fox. "Role Strains of a Health Care Team in a Poverty Community:
the Columbia Point Experience." Social Science and Medicine, vol. 6,
1972.
Beale and Schroeder. "Marketing For an Urban Health Center." Health Services
Reports, vol. 88, no. 1, January, 1973.
Beckhardt, R. "Organizational Issues in the Team Delivery of Comprehensive
Health Care" Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 3, July,
1972.
Bodenheimer, T. "The Turning Point for Public Hospitals" Health/Pac Bulletin,
no. 51 April, 1973.
Braeger, J. "Bargaining. A Method of Community Change" Social Work, Oct. 1969.
Candib and Stoeckle. "The Neighborhood Health Center. Reform Ideas of Yester-
day and Today." New England Journal of Medicine, vol. 80, no. 5,
June, 1969.
Crenson, M. "Organizational Factors in Citizen Participation" Journal of
Politics, vol. 36, p. 438, 1974.
162.
Demonstration Cities and Metropolitian Development Act, 1966. Section 103
(a) (2).
Economic Opportunity Act of 1964. Section 202(a).
Ehrenreich and Ehrenreich. "Health Care and Social Control" Social Policy,
May - June, 1974.
Flynn, B. "The Effectiveness of Nurse Clinician's Service Delivery."
American Journal of Public Health. vol. 64, no. 6, June, 1974.
Frieden and Kaplan. Politics of Neglect. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1975.
Friedson, E. Professional Dominance The Social Structure of Medical Care.
New York: Atherton, 1970.
Haughton, J. "The Role of the Public General Hospital in Community Health.
1974 Rosenhaus Lecture" American Journal of Public Health, vol. 65,
no. 1, January, 1975.
Henriques, Viradamo, and Kahane. "Performance of Adult Health Appraisal
Examinations Utilizing Nurse Practitioner Physician Teams and Para-
medical Personnel." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 64,
no. 1, January, 1974.
Hollister, R. "Neighborhood Health Politics in Denver.' Symposium on
Decision Making and Control in Medical Care, New York Academy of
Medicine, 1970.
Hollister, Kramer, and Bellin (eds.) Neighborhood Health Centers. Lexington:
Lexington Books, 1974.
Kluge, Wegryh, and Lemeg. "The' Expanding Emergency Room Department."
Journal of the American Medical Association vol. 191, no. 10.
Lindbloom, C. The Tntelligence of Democracy. New York: Free Press, 1965.
Lipsky, M. "Street Level Bureaucracy and the Analysis of Urban Reform"
Urban Affairs Quarterly, vol. 6, no. 4 June, 1971.
Long, N. "The Local Community As an Ecology of Games." American Journal
of Sociology vol, 64, no. 3, November, 1958.
Macht, L. "Neighborhood Psychiatry." Psychiatric Annals, vol. 4, no. 9,
September, 1974.
Marris and Rein. Dilemmas of Social Reform. New York: Atherton, 1969.
Merenstein, Wolf, Barker. "The Use of the Nurse Practitioner in General
Practice." Medical Care, -vol. 12, no. 5, May, 1974.
163.
Morehead and Donaldson. "Quality of Clinical Management of Disease in Com-
prehensive Neighborhood Health Centers." Medical Care, vol. 12,
no. 4, April, 1974.
Morehead, Donaldson, and Seravelli. "Comparison Between OEO Neighborhood
Health Centers and Other Health Care Providers on Ratings of Quality
of Care." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 61, no. 7, July,1971.
Polsby, N. "How to Study Community Power. The Pluralist Alternative.
Journal of Politics, vol. 12, August, 1960.
Pressman and Wildavsky. Implementation. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1973.
Ra'bin and Beckhardt. "Factors Influencing Effectiveness of Health Teams."
Millbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 3, July 1972.
Ryan, W. Blaming the Victim. New York: Pantheon, 1971.
Salber, Feldman, Rosenberry, Williams. "Utilization of Services At a
Neighborhood Health Center." Pediatrics, vol. 47, no. 2, February,
1971.
Skiffer, G. "Community Participation in Cambridge Model Cities. Why It
Failed." M.C.P. thesis at MIT, 1972.
Skrovan, Anderson, and Goltschalk. "Community Nurse Practitioner, An
Emerging Role." American Journal of Public Health. vol. 64, no. 9,
September, 1974.
Sparer, Dires, Smith. "Consumer Participation in OEO Assisted Neighborhood
Health Centers." American Journal of Public Health, vol. 60, June 1970.
Sparer and Johnson. "Evaluation of Neighborhood Health Centers." American
Journal of Public Health. vol. 61, no. 5, May 1971.
Spitzer, Sackett, Sibley, Roberts, Gent, Kergin, Hackett, Olynich. "The
Burlington Randomized Trial of the Nurse Practitioner." New England
Journal of Medicine. vol. 29, no. 5, January 1974.
Stanley, D. Managing Local Government Under Union Pressure. Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1972.
Tagliacozzo, Luskin, Lashoff, Liama. "Nurse Practitioner Information and
Patient Behavior." American Journal of Public Health. vol. 64,
no. 6, June 1974.
Taller and Feldman "The Training and Utilization of Nurse Practitioners
in Adult Health Appraisal." Medical Care. vol. 12, no. 1, January,
1974.
164.
Wilson, J. (ed.) City Politics and Public Policy. New York: Wiley, 1968.
Wolf (ed.) 1984 Revisited. New York: A. Knopf, 1973.
References Concerning Cambridge
Barron, Cohen and Yim. "Site Alternatives for a Prepaid Group Practice in
Cambridge." Prepared for Dept. of Community Medicine. Cambridge
Hospital.
Buckey, D. "Staff Summary Determination of Need by Public Health Council
on Application #34252" 2/10/76.
Cambridge Annual Budget 1975-76.
Cambridge Model Cities Agency, Planning and Evaluation Department. Impact
Study. An Analysis of Impact of Reordering Federal Budgeting Pri-
orities in Cambridge. May 7, 1973.
CEOC budget, 1975-76. "CEOC Neighborhood Health Station Program"
CEOC. "A Brief Review of the History and Status of the Neighborhood Health
Station Program" December 1972.
HEW Family Planning Budget Proposal 1973-74. prepared by the Department
of Community Medicine, Cambridge Hospital.
Health Care Policy Council By-Laws
HUD Neighborhood Facilities Grant Proposal. NF P MA 01061006
Neighborhood Health Stations Crisis Coalition. "A Neighborhood Health Station
Program for Cambridge" January 1973.
Planning and Development Department of Cambridge. Social Characteristics
of Cambridge. vol. I, vol. II, 1971.
